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A B ST R AC T. The Reconstruction Amendments are justly celebrated for transforming millions
of recent slaves into voting citizens. Yet this legacy of egalitarian enfranchisement had a flip side.
In arguing that voting laws should not discriminate on the basis of morally insignificant statuses,
such as race, supporters of the Reconstruction Amendments emphasized the legitimacy of
retributive disenfranchisement as a punishment for immoral actions, such as crimes. Former
slaves were not just compared with virtuous military veterans, as commentators have long
observed, but were also contrasted with immoral criminals. The mutually supportive
relationship between egalitarian enfranchisement and punitive disenfranchisement -between
voting and vice - motivated and shaped all three Reconstruction Amendments.
Counterintuitively, the constitutional entrenchment of criminal disenfranchisement facilitated
the enfranchisement of black Americans. This conclusion complicates the conventional
understanding of how and why voting rights expanded in the Reconstruction era.
Criminal disenfranchisement's previously overlooked constitutional history illuminates
four contemporary legal debates. First, the connection between voting and vice provides new
support for the Supreme Court's thoroughly criticized holding that the Constitution endorses
criminal disenfranchisement. Second, Reconstruction history suggests that the Constitution's
endorsement of criminal disenfranchisement extends only to serious crimes. For that reason,
disenfranchisement for minor criminal offenses, such as misdemeanors, may be
unconstitutional. Third, the Reconstruction Amendments' common intellectual origin refutes
recent arguments by academics and judges that the Fifteenth Amendment impliedly repealed the
Fourteenth Amendment's endorsement of criminal disenfranchisement. Finally, the historical
relationship between voting and vice suggests that felon disenfranchisement is specially
protected from federal regulation but not categorically immune to challenge under the Voting
Rights Act.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States disenfranchises approximately five million of its citizens
for crime.' Most of these individuals committed felonies, but some states
disenfranchise misdemeanants as well.' These practices make America a global
outlier.' In many other democratic nations, recent political and legal debates
have centered not on whether released offenders should be afforded the right
to vote (they already have that right), but rather on whether prisoners
convicted of serious crimes should be able to vote during their terms of
incarceration. For example, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights ruled in 2005 that the United Kingdom could not automatically
disenfranchise convicts serving custodial sentences.4 Similar rulings have
issued in Australia, Canada, and South Africa.'
The propriety of American criminal disenfranchisement has come under
increasing scrutiny. Critics point to the practice's racially disparate effects,
doubtful public benefits, and high-profile impact on tightly contested
1. See Nicole D. Porter, Expanding the Vote: State Felony Disenfranchisement Reform 1997-2010,
SENT'G PROJECT 3 (Oct. 2010), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
publications/vr expandingtheVoteFinalAddendum.pdf.
2. See Alec Ewald, A 'Crazy-Quilt' of Tiny Pieces: State and Local Administration of American
Criminal Disenfanchisement Law, SENT'G PROJECT, at i (Nov. 2005), http://www
.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/crazyquilt.pdf (discussing states that disenfranchise
incarcerated misdemeanants); see also Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. 2011)
(upholding Indiana's authority to disenfranchise convicts during their incarceration, while
reaching only state law issues); id. at 785 (explaining that "several states, either by their
constitutions or their statutes, disenfranchise all prisoners convicted of any crimes,"
including misdemeanors); cf Erika Wood & Rachel Bloom, De Facto Disenfanchisement, AM.
C.L. UNION & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2-3 (2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/
publications/og.o8.DeFacto.Disenfranchisement.pdf (discussing de facto as opposed to de
jure disenfranchisement of misdemeanants).
3. ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF Ex-FELONS 12 (20o6) ("Virtually every
other democratic nation in the world considers America's disenfranchisement laws unjust
and punitive."). American criminal disenfranchisement is especially remarkable in light of
America's leading role in the "constitutionalization of democratic politics." Richard H.
Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2oo3 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic
Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 29, 31 (2004) (discussing the "constitutionalization of democratic
politics" that is "most acute in the United States Supreme Court, but . . . visible in other
constitutional courts as well").
4. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41 (2005).
5. See Roach v. Electoral Comm'r (2007) 233 CLR 162 (Austl.); Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.); Minister of Home Affairs v. Nat'l Inst. for Crime




elections. Perhaps in response to these forceful criticisms, many states have
softened their disenfranchisement regimes or facilitated the restoration of
voting rights.' Unlike reformers in many other countries, however, American
critics of criminal disenfranchisement have not succeeded in enlisting the
judiciary's assistance. Courts in the United States apply heightened scrutiny
when reviewing challenges to most state voting qualifications,' the use of voter
identification cards,' the design of political districts,'o and even the
implementation of ballot recounts." Yet these same courts have consistently
declined to scrutinize criminal disenfranchisement laws."
The constitutional law of American felon disenfranchisement turns on the
otherwise obscure second section of the Fourteenth Amendment." Section 2 is
"one of the Constitution's enduring mysteries." 4 Though never enforced by
Congress or the courts," Section 2 directs that states lose representation in
Congress in proportion to their disenfranchisement of adult male citizens. But
Section 2 exempts from this apportionment penalty state disenfranchisement
based on "rebellion, or other crime. in the 1974 decision Richardson v.
Ramirez, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 2's exception constituted
an "affirmative sanction" 7-or, as a later case would put it, an "implicit
authorization"'"-for felon disenfranchisement. In the Court's view, the Equal
Protection Clause contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment "could
not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was
6. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Law of Prisons, 115 HL-ARv. L. REv. 1838, 1940-41
nn.13-18 (2002) (collecting criticisms of felon disenfranchisement) [hereinafter Law of
Prisons].
7. See generally Porter, supra note i (describing recent changes in disenfranchisement laws).
8. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
9. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (20o8).
1o. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (relying on the Equal Protection Clause); see also
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2oo6) (Voting Rights Act).
n1. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections,
635 F. 3 d 219 (6th Cir. 2011).
12. See infra notes 20-21.
13. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974); see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
14. Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right To Vote: Did the
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 259
(2004).
1s. See id. at 260.
16. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 2.
17. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54.
18. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
1587
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation"
provided under Section 2.1'
Ramirez and its reasoning have had far-reaching implications. Today,
Ramirez "is generally recognized as having closed the door on the equal
protection argument in a challenge to state statutory voting disqualifications
for conviction of crime."2 0 Felon disenfranchisement laws, in other words,
"have been exempted from standard fundamental rights equal protection
analysis." 1 Only disenfranchisement provisions demonstrably motivated by
racial animus are vulnerable to an Equal Protection Clause attack.2 ' Because
Ramirez has stymied constitutional challenges to felon disenfranchisement
laws, reformers who hope to challenge those measures have turned away from
the Constitution and toward the Voting Rights Act (VRA).2
But Ramirez's interpretation of Section 2 has also shaped judicial
interpretations of the VRA. Because it prohibits state voting qualifications with
disparate racial impact, the VRA is most naturally read to preempt many state
felon disenfranchisement laws.' Yet every federal circuit to rule on the
question has held to the contrary, based in large part on Ramirez and Section
2.2' The Eleventh Circuit's 2005 en banc decision emphasized that "Florida's
discretion to deny the vote to convicted felons is fixed by the text of § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.", The en banc Second Circuit noted in 2006 that its
"starting point" would be "the explicit approval given felon disenfranchisement
provisions in the Constitution."" The First Circuit said in 2009 that "[t]he
power of the states to disqualify from voting those convicted of crimes is
explicitly set forth in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12" And in 2010, the en
19. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55.
20. Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 395 (4 th Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 454 U.S.
807 (1981); accord Perry v. Beamer, 933 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. Va. 1996) (quotingAllen).
21. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over
Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1147, 1153 (2004).
22. See Underwood, 471 U.S. at 227-28 (1985).
23. See Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting
RightsAct: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 (1993).
24. See infra note 429 and accompanying text.
25. See Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3 d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Simmons v. Galvin,
575 F. 3 d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2009); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3 d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc);
Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F-3 d 1214 (ilth Cir. 2005) (en banc).
26. Johnson, 405 F.3 d at 1228.
27. Hayden, 449 F. 3d at 316.




banc Ninth Circuit cited Ramirez to conclude that "felon disenfranchisement
has an affirmative sanction in the Fourteenth Amendment." 9
Despite its obvious legal importance, Ramirez has endured decades of
withering criticism. Leading constitutional theorists argue that Section 2's
"other crime" language is a mere exception, not an "affirmative sanction," and
so cannot limit the meaning of separate constitutional provisions such as the
Equal Protection Clause or the Fifteenth Amendment.30 As a number of Second
Circuit judges put it, "Declining to prohibit something is not the same as
protecting it."" Other critics argue that the "crime" exception establishes no
affirmative endorsement because it was included as a mere afterthought" or
because Section 2 as a whole was the unprincipled product of "political
exigency."3 Yet other critics allege that Ramirez read the "other crime" phrase
too broadly, since it originally referred only to crimes similar to rebellion or
treason and so carried too narrow a meaning to support disenfranchisement for
many modern offenses, such as possession of illegal drugs. 4 And still other
critics contend that the Fifteenth Amendment's blanket ban on racial
discrimination in voting impliedly repealed the ostensibly more limited
apportionment penalty in Section 2, thereby removing from the Constitution
any affirmative sanction that Section 2 might once have enshrined."
This Article draws on the history of the Reconstruction Amendments to
recover the original justification for the constitutionality of felon
disenfranchisement. At the same time, the Article suggests a historically
grounded line of argument against the constitutionality of criminal
disenfranchisement for misdemeanors and other insufficiently serious offenses.
The argument proceeds in two Parts.
Part I advances a novel historical thesis. It demonstrates that all three
Reconstruction Amendments, as well as a number of important
Reconstruction-era statutes, were motivated and shaped by what this Article
29. Farrakhan, 623 F.3d at 993.
30. See infra notes 325 & 328 (collecting sources).
31. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 349 (Parker, J., dissenting).
32. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 149 (2001) [hereinafter FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION];
George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1903-04 (1999) [hereinafter Fletcher, Disenfranchisement].
33. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" To Vote, and the
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 43-44).
34. See infra note 352 (collecting sources).
35. See infra note 392 (collecting sources).
1589
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
calls "the irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement" -that is, the tendency of
radical egalitarians in the Reconstruction era to justify the enfranchisement
of black Americans by simultaneously defending the disenfranchisement of
criminals. The political figures most responsible for the Reconstruction
Amendments were legislators known as radical Republicans. These egalitarian
figures were profoundly influenced by what James Q. Whitman has called "the
philosophy of formal equality"-that is, the view that a legitimate political
order distinguishes persons by their actions and not by their station. 6
The radicals drew on the philosophy of formal equality not only to insist on the
liberation and then enfranchisement of former slaves, but also to endorse the
disenfranchisement of criminals, rebels, and other wrongdoers. The same
political philosophy thus underlay both the expansion of constitutional voting
rights without regard to race and the constitutional entrenchment of punitive
disenfranchisement. Because the historical relationship between racial
enfranchisement and criminal disenfranchisement will strike many twenty-first
century readers as paradoxical, this Article refers to it as an "irony." But that
characterization is deliberately anachronistic. In the Reconstruction Congress,
even the most egalitarian legislators viewed racial enfranchisement and
criminal disenfranchisement as two sides of the same philosophical coin.
Part II draws on the foregoing history to address four clusters of arguments
concerning the contemporary lawfulness of criminal disenfranchisement. First,
the irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement supports Ramirez's intensely
criticized conclusion that the Constitution exhibits affirmative approval of
criminal disenfranchisement." The "other crime" exception was not an
accident, oversight, or political stratagem, as commentators have assumed, but
rather the textual expression of a deep political principle -indeed, the very
same principle relied on by the drafters and supporters of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fifteenth Amendment. The
historical record further demonstrates that Section 2's drafters contemplated
criminal disenfranchisement not just for "rebellion" but also for many
conventional crimes."
Second, Section 2's endorsement of criminal disenfranchisement was
limited to offenses of sufficient gravity to constitute forfeiture of political
rights. The term "crime" sometimes carried that narrower meaning, and
Congress's governing theory of political morality suggests that the narrow
36. See JAMES Q WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 51 (2003) (discussing formal equality).
37. See infra Section II.A.




meaning was intended. Only serious crimes replicated in miniature the
Confederacy's "rebellion" against legitimate government. Supporting that
inference, contemporaneous legislation combated racist disenfranchisement by
using language narrower than Section 2's broad "other crime" locution.
Ramirez and the "affirmative sanction" it identified might be construed in light
of this history.
Third, criminal disenfranchisement's role in the drafting and ratification of
the Reconstruction Amendments undermines the now-prominent argument
that the Fifteenth Amendment impliedly repealed Section 2.' Even if Section 2
were impliedly repealed-itself a highly dubious proposition-the "other
crime" exception would continue to shed light on the remainder of the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as the historically connected Fifteenth
Amendment. Because the same pro-disenfranchisement worldview gave rise to
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Ramirez's "affirmative sanction"
holding can survive Section 2's demise.
Fourth, Reconstruction history suggests that while criminal
disenfranchisement is specially protected from federal regulation, it should not
be categorically immune to challenge under the VRA. Even during military
Reconstruction, Congress doubted the legitimacy of barring state felon
disenfranchisement statutes. Yet Reconstruction history demonstrates that
formal equality values sometimes favor federal prophylaxis to thwart invidious
discrimination. Courts can honor that history by adopting a special
presumption in favor of criminal disenfranchisement laws when applying the
VRA's totality-of-circumstances analysis .4
Finally, the Conclusion returns to the historical thesis outlined in Part I to
note that the intellectual history of criminal disenfranchisement illuminates
broader trends in the evolution of American voting rights. Constitutional
historians have long observed that Reconstruction radicals cited the patriotism
of black Civil War veterans as proof that the former slaves had earned the right
to vote.4 Indeed, a group's assistance in times of armed conflict has often been
associated with its inclusion in the franchise.4 ' But this familiar "ballots and
bullets"" narrative had a flip side. Former slaves were not just exalted as
39. See infra Section II.C.
40. See infra Section II.D.
41. See infra note 88 (collecting sources).
42. Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right To Vote, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2003) ("[T]hose who fight, or contribute to the war effort, acquire a
moral claim to full participation in self-government.").
43. Id.
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veterans but also contrasted with rebels and criminals, whose bad acts merited
disenfranchisement.
The three-sided relationship between voting, valor, and vice casts criminal
disenfranchisement in a new light. Commentators have grown accustomed to
viewing criminal disenfranchisement as a product of antebellum classism or as
a tool of racist oppression in the Jim Crow South-which it most certainly
was." Yet an investigation of Reconstruction history reveals a more
complicated political and intellectual legacy. When invoked by nineteenth-
century progressives determined to enfranchise former slaves, as well as
women and other disenfranchised groups, public endorsements of criminal
disenfranchisement facilitated radically egalitarian reform.
I. THE IRONY OF EGALITARIAN DISENFRANCHISEMENT
This Part demonstrates that the Reconstruction Amendments were
motivated and shaped by the irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement-that is,
the tendency for egalitarian legislators to defend the disenfranchisement of
criminals even as those legislators fought for the enfranchisement of black
Americans. The irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement is not merely that
egalitarian constitutional norms were thought to be compatible with criminal
disenfranchisement, in the way that the Equal Protection Clause may have
been deemed compatible with segregated public education.4 ' Nor is the point
simply that the Amendments' framers-like more recent constitutional
interpreters**-identified a principled basis for criminal disenfranchisement.
Rather, the point is that the same concept of formal equality that animated the
Reconstruction Amendments also found expression in laws providing for the
punitive disenfranchisement of rebels and criminals. Radical Republicans used
44. See, e.g., WARD E.Y. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT'S
ROLE IN VOTING RIGHTS DISPUTES, 1845-1969, at 43-44 (1974); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE
RIGHT To VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 51 f.19
(rev. ed. 2009); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 30-34 (2004); JEFF MANZA &
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 54-55 (20o6); Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Ballot
Manipulation and the "Menace of Negro Domination": Racial Threat and Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850-2oo2, 109 AM. J. Soc. 559, 597-98 (2003).
45. See John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L. REv. 1185, 1195 (2001) (noting that
"Section 2 says nothing stronger on the subject of denying felons the franchise than that in
1868 it was assumed to be constitutional," much as "most of the amendment's framers and
ratifiers did not believe they were invalidating racially segregated schools").




the same philosophical system to argue both that black Americans had earned
the right to vote and that rebels and criminals deserved disenfranchisement.
Reconstruction legislators viewed criminal disenfranchisement as an integral
part of their ideal legal order, and they accordingly referred to it when
describing that ideal.
The argument proceeds as follows. Section L.A sets the stage by drawing on
the work of James Q. Whitman to describe the philosophy of formal equality
and to outline its importance to the radical Republicans - that is, to the
political figures most responsible for the Reconstruction Amendments. Section
I.B then identifies crime's role in abolitionist political thought and in the
Thirteenth Amendment, which included its own crime exception. Next,
Section I.C discusses the two provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment that on
their face addressed political rights: Section 2, which created an apportionment
penalty for states that engaged in certain forms of disenfranchisement
(including racial disenfranchisement), and Section 3, which addressed the
political rights of a Reconstruction-era group contemporaneously compared
with criminals: Confederate rebels. Section I.D then discusses foundational
Reconstruction statutes to show that radical Republicans contemplated the
possibility that Southern racists might use disenfranchisement laws to oppress
black voters. Despite those well-founded concerns, Congress took deliberate
steps to preserve criminal disenfranchisement, albeit in a limited form. Finally,
Section I.E examines the Fifteenth Amendment's drafting history and related
floor debates. Throughout those debates, even the most radical supporters of
broad voting rights strove to preserve criminal disenfranchisement. In fact,
express endorsements of criminal disenfranchisement formed an integral part
of radicals' arguments against racial and other objectionable voting
qualifications. This is the irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement.
A. Formal Equality in Reconstruction
Formal equality is the notion that what you do is more important than who
you are, that voluntary actions are morally significant and so should be
prioritized over inherited statuses. Drawing on the language of contemporary
analytic philosophy, Professor Whitman has defined the philosophy of "formal
equality" as a kind of "act-egalitarianism" in that it advocated "equal treatment
for all persons who had committed the same act."47 In the Reconstruction era,
leading members of the Republican Party advocated formal equality under the
47. WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 12, 51 (emphasis omitted).
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banner of "equal[ity] before the law." 4 This ideology was legalistic in that it
supported only civil and political equality in law, as distinguished from social
equality in private life. 49 Drawing on older egalitarian traditions in American
political thought, Republicans argued that violations of formal equality yielded
"oligarchy" or "aristocracy," social structures antithetical to American values.so
Republican Congressman William Loughridge provided a vivid example of
formal equality reasoning during debates on the Fifteenth Amendment.
Arguing against racial discrimination in the franchise, Loughridge bemoaned a
world where:
if a man be of white blood, though he may be destitute of talent,
intelligence, patriotism, or virtue . . . all the privileges of the governing
class are freely accorded to him . . . . But if a man unfortunately be of
African descent . . . although he may have an intellect of the highest
order, a cultivated mind, and a character unsullied by vice . . . , yet
notwithstanding all this he is ruthlessly and cruelly thrust down and
consigned, without question and without reason, to hopeless
degradation. s
Loughridge wanted the franchise to correspond with moral desert: a person's
"virtue" should earn him "all the privileges of the governing class."
Loughridge was not alone. In the 186os, Congress was led by legislators
aptly known as "radical" Republicans." Embracing formal equality, these
figures challenged entrenched status-based legal classifications, including the
48. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 112, 273 & 276.
49. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
230-31 (1988).
so. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 2d Sess. 1971 (Mar. 18, 1868) (statement of Rep.
Fernando Beaman); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. app. at 256 (July 9, 1866)
(statement of Rep. Jehu Baker); id. at 1224-32 (Mar. 7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1069 (Feb. 24, 1865) (statement of Sen.
Charles Sumner); see also HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY AND FREEDMEN'S RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1966, at 138-53 (2000) (discussing views on
"equality before the law" during Reconstruction).
51. CONG. GLOBE, 4 0th Cong., 3 d Sess. app. at 200 (Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Rep. William
Loughridge).
52. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEs BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 27-33 (1974) (providing one of many
categorized lists of Reconstruction legislators). Radical Republicans exerted great but not
unlimited influence. Id.; see also FONER, supra note 49, at 238 (explaining that "the Radicals,
while hardly 'in control' of Congress, enjoyed substantial power, constituting nearly half the




dichotomies between slaves and freepersons, blacks and whites, women and
men. The radicals found support for expanded voting rights in Christian
scripture" and in the works of recognized jurists and philosophers of formal
equality, such as William Blackstone,s4 Cesare Beccaria,ss and John Stuart
Mill. 6 The radicals' efforts yielded the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing
slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment conferring birthright citizenship and
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws, and the Fifteenth Amendment
barring racial discrimination in voting. By any standard, these measures
constituted major egalitarian reforms.
But if the philosophy of formal equality had the egalitarian power to
liberate, it also had the retributive potential to degrade." Like traitorous rebels,
criminals who violated the law's evenhanded commands were thought to have
cast themselves beneath the equal dignity afforded by law. Precisely because
egalitarian Republicans defined their desired legal order in terms of
53. Compare Acts 10:34 (King James) (Saint Peter famously declaring: "I perceive that God is no
respecter of persons"), and Romans 2:11 (King James) ("For there is no respect of persons
with God."), with CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 2d Sess. 1966-68 (Mar. 18, 1868) (statement
of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens) (deploying religious and contractarian arguments while
proposing a bill that would eliminate racial vote qualifications but preserve criminal
disenfranchisement for felonies at common law), CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 253
(Jan. 3, 1867) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens) ("I would say to those ... who admit
the justice of human equality before the law but doubt its policy: 'Do you believe in hell?"'),
and infra note 54. See also SALMON P. CHASE, THE ADDRESS AND REPLY ON THE PRESENTATION
OF A TESTIMONIAL TO S.P. CHASE BY THE COLORED PEOPLE OF CINCINNATI 27 (Moonshiner
Press 1989) (1845); infra note 118.
54. As Professor Whitman has observed, Blackstone drew on scriptural passages, see supra note
53, when praising the fairness of (often harsh) common law punishments, "which the law
has beforehand ordained, for every subject alike, without respect of persons." WHITMAN,
supra note 36, at 41-42 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *371). Borrowing
from Blackstone and Saint Paul, Representative John Bingham argued that the Constitution
should be amended to provide the former slaves political rights because "[t]he law in every
State should be just; it should be no respecter of persons." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist
Sess. 1291 (Mar. 9, 1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham); see also George Washington
Julian, The Slavery Question in Its Present Relations to American Politics (June 29, 1855), in
GEORGE WASHINGTON JULIAN, SPEECHES ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS 102, 103-04, 119 (1872)
(arguing that slavery is incompatible with Christian teachings).
5. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3 d Sess. app. at 1o (Jan. 30, 1869) (statement of Rep.
Charles Hamilton) (quoting Beccaria); see also WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 42 (including
Beccaria in a list of philosophers who shared the Enlightenment ideal of formal equality in
the law).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 271-279.
57. See WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 41-55 (arguing outside the voting context that formal
equality's "triumph" in the United States has created a tendency to "take all offenders down
a peg" and so to dispense "harsh justice").
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evenhandedness and impartiality, those legislators also tended to view willful
violators of the law-criminals-as enemies and outsiders. Recall that in the
passage just quoted, Representative Loughridge not only praised the "virtue"
of black Americans, but also condemned the "vice" of many immoral whites."
In arguing so insistently that the former did not deserve "hopeless
degradation," Loughridge insinuated that the latter might." Other radicals
would make this implication explicit,6 o as evidenced by their most important
legislative achievements.
The radicals thus adopted what might be called a thin conception of
political virtue. Being entitled to vote did not mean professing articles of faith,
belonging to an elite family, or inheriting racial purity. Consistent with
modern voting rights precedents,"' the radicals did not condition
enfranchisement on the likelihood of casting a ballot for one candidate or
policy as opposed to another. Rather, being entitled to vote meant choosing to
abide by standards of lawful conduct." On that view, statuses like race could
not define a legitimate voting qualification, whereas the criminal law did.
Other voting qualifications posed disputed marginal cases. For example, most
58. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 200 (Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Rep. William
Loughridge).
sq. Id.
6o. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 2d Sess. 1956 (Mar. 18, 1868) (statement of Rep. John
Broomall) ("I do not, of course, deny the right to disfranchise individuals as a punishment
for crime, but I do deny the right to make the disfranchisement hereditary [through racial
voting qualifications].").
61. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) ("The exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a
fear of the political views of a particular group of bona fide residents." (quoting Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)) (alterations and quotation marks omitted)). Some
modern defenders of criminal disenfranchisement's lawfulness have advanced arguments
that seem inconsistent with this principle. See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445,
451-52 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) ("A contention that the equal protection clause requires
New York to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or judges would not only
be without merit but as obviously so as anything can be.").
62. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (Dec. lo, 1866) (statement of Sen. Henry
Wilson) ("If you could establish as a standard of suffrage integrity of character, I would
agree to it; but as only the eye of God can judge the heart of man we cannot make that
standard a test."). Because children cannot conform to law, they were not disenfranchised
but rather by "nature" disabled from voting: for them, "the right may sleep, but it dies
never." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. app. at 104 (Feb. 19, 1866) (statement of Sen.




Republicans viewed literacy qualifications as legitimate63 and property
qualifications as illegitimate.64
Having used formal equality to distinguish political virtue from vice, the
radicals took the further step of concluding that vice justified
disenfranchisement. This second step is important, since formal equality in
itself requires only equal treatment for equal acts, not any particular form of
equal treatment. A society committed to formal equality could in principle
punish all instances of bad conduct with equal mercy, though adopting that
policy would diminish the salience of formal equality by reducing the
difference in treatment between bad and good actors. The radicals adopted a
different course, choosing to punish with formally equal harshness in the
domain of voting rights. That approach increased the salience of formal
equality and, therefore, of crime. As one legislator put it, "I will not consent to
any disqualification except it be the commission of crime."s6 Those who defied
the rule of law were thought to have voluntarily set themselves apart from the
body politic and to have forfeited the right to self-rule. Vice was defined by bad
conduct, and bad conduct merited disenfranchisement.
Egalitarian disenfranchisement during the Reconstruction era can be
viewed as a distinctive instantiation of a more general historical tendency
among democratic societies. As political theorists have long observed, states
often include new groups in democracy while self-consciously excluding
others.66 In the Congresses of the late 186os, the relevant line of demarcation
was in large part defined by formal equality: Republicans aspired to include
those who abided by the law and to exclude those who violated it. The historic
result was that millions of former slaves gained political power and millions of
former Confederates and other criminals lost it. The irony of egalitarian
disenfranchisement transformed America and its Constitution-as the
remainder of this Part will show.
63. See infra Section I.E. Those with the opposite view often argued that the ballot was itself the
best "educator." E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 850 (Jan. 30, 1868) (statement of
Sen. Aaron Cragin) ("I regard the ballot as a great educator . . . ."); see also Vikram David
Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 5o STAN. L. REV. 915, 934
nn.52-53 (1998) (collecting sources).
64. CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 2d Sess. 850 (Jan. 30, 1868) (statement of Sen. Aaron Cragin);
see also CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 385 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Jehu
Baker) (explaining that a "property qualification" is "quite as odious and quite as dangerous
to liberty as disenfranchisement on account of race or color").
65. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 850 (Jan. 30, 1868) (statement of Sen. Aaron Cragin)
(explaining that he was against race, property, and literacy qualifications while supporting
"manhood suffrage").
66. See Charles Taylor, The Dynamics ofDemocratic Exclusion, 9 J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1998, at 143.
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B. The Thirteenth Amendment
In the wake of the Civil War, many radicals hoped that the Thirteenth
Amendment would both free and enfranchise the slaves.61 That vision was
postponed, however, as the Thirteenth Amendment did not address voting
rights. The Amendment's intellectual history nonetheless provides essential
background to Reconstruction-era debates over suffrage. In short, leading
abolitionists argued against slavery by contrasting that illegitimate institution
with the concededly legitimate institution of criminal incarceration. A trace of
the philosophical connection between permissible punishment and
impermissible slavery remains in the Thirteenth Amendment's crime
exception.
Cabining and eventually eliminating slavery had been the focal concerns of
the Republican Party since its inception. As attention increasingly turned from
emancipation to enfranchisement, Republicans built on the theoretical
foundations they had already created. Though the intellectual landscape of
American abolitionism was broad and complex, 8 one prominent landmark is
particularly relevant here: John Locke's contractarian theory of government.
Leading abolitionists from Alvan Stewart7 o to Senator Charles Sumner71
67. See, e.g., XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE AND NORTHERN
REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910, at 15-18 (1997) (discussing in particular efforts by Representative
Ashley and Senator Sumner).
68. See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977).
69. See David A.J. Richards, Abolitionist Political and Constitutional Theory and the Reconstruction
Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1187, 1194-95 (1992) ("The premise of [radical as opposed
to moderate antislavery thought] was its view of the proper understanding of the
relationship of Lockean political theory to constitutional interpretation."). Reconstruction
Congressmen regularly propounded contractarian views reminiscent of Locke's political
thought. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 3d Sess. app. at 127 (Feb. 5, 1869) (statement of
Rep. James Mullins) ("Government stands based upon the natural right of every individual
man, a right which can to a certain extent be compromised, so that the body-corporate may
exercise certain powers surrendered by the parties who united to organize it.").
70. Consider the following passage from Alvan Stewart's 1837 speech to the New York
Anti-Slavery Society, which focused on the practice of capturing fugitive slaves without
trial: "The only difference between a freeman and a slave, under the Constitution, was that
the freeman was deprived of his liberty by due process of law, for crime, and the slave was
deprived of his liberty by due process of law, simply because he was a slave . . . ." Alvan
Stewart, A Constitutional Argument on the Subject of Slavery, Address to the New York
Anti-Slavery Society (Sept. 1837), in JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw app. B at 287
(Collier Books 1965) (1951). TenBroek identified the argument outlined above as Stewart's





invoked the Lockean notion that a legitimate government has a reciprocal
relationship with its citizens." Under that theory, the state protects individual
rights in exchange for the individual's loyalty to the state.7 ' The contractarian
tradition allowed for citizenship and residence requirements that delineated
membership in a political community, but the same tradition also encouraged
Republicans to define their polity in terms of adherence to law. In the years
leading up to and during the Civil War, American abolitionists routinely
appropriated contractarian political thought to distinguish the illegitimate
treatment of slaves from the legitimate treatment of criminals.
Consider Theodore Weld, whose important74 1838 tract argued that
Congress had the power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia." Weld's
most fervent appeal was framed in abstract Lockean terms. Because slaves were
a kind of subject from whom the federal government had exacted allegiance,
Weld argued that the government had not just the power but also the
responsibility to protect them. Weld's extensive argument culminated in a
question: "Is the government of the United States unable to grant protection
where it exacts allegiance?" Weld answered dramatically: "Protection is the
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT of every human being under the exclusive legislation
71. See, e.g., Sen. Charles Sumner, Promises of the Declaration of Independence and Abraham
Lincoln, Eulogy on Abraham Lincoln Before the Municipal Authorities of the City of Boston
(June 1, 1865), in 12 CHARLES SUMNER: His COMPLETE WORKS 235, 295 (Lee & Shepard
1900) (1874) (insisting in his eulogy for Lincoln "on the equality of all before the law, and
the consent of the governed" (emphasis omitted)).
72. See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War
and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 878 n.58 (1986) (collecting sources).
73. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g
Co. 1980) (1690); see also Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1073-74 (discussing
Locke's view "that criminals forfeit their political rights").
74. Weld's essay has been called "a restatement and synthesis of abolitionist constitutional
theory as of that time." TENBROEK, supra note 70, app. A at 243; see also id. at 47-48. In the
passage quoted in the main text, "Weld rephrases what was now the ark of the
constitutional covenant for abolitionists: the protection of the laws." Id. Weld's essay had a
significant legacy. As one commentator put it, "the "foundation of [what would become the
radical antislavery view] had been laid earlier by the abolitionist Theodore Weld," whose
"analysis invoked the Lockean political theory that legitimate government must protect
equal rights." Richards, supra note 69, at 1194.
75. THEODORE DWIGHT WELD, THE POWER OF CONGRESS OVER SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA (New York, American Anti-Slavery Society 1838), reprinted in TENBROEK, Supra
note 70, app. A at 278. President Lincoln would ultimately sign the Emancipation Act for
Washington, D.C. on April 16, 1862, with the Emancipation Proclamation following five
months later.
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of Congress who has not forfeited it by crime.", 6 It is easy to overlook this climactic
statement's apparently disconnected last few words, which exempt from
constitutional protection those who have "forfeited it by crime." Yet Weld
included this disclaimer, not as an afterthought, but because it was integral to
his overall argument.77 Criminals had not demonstrated "allegiance" to the
state; therefore, they did not merit the state's "protection." Similar arguments
became a staple of abolitionist literature.
In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment achieved both halves of Weld's
contractarian vision: the Amendment prohibited racial slavery while
specifically exempting slavery and involuntary servitude when imposed "as
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."7 ' As
Professor Whitman has observed, the Thirteenth Amendment's exception for
punitive servitude appears to the modern reader as a "strange and striking
fact.""o Remarkably, "American constitutional law formally embraced the idea
that convicts were to be reduced to slaves in 1865-the year of the completion
of the second revolution in America, the shining date in the history of
American abolitionism."s' But any perception of irony is anachronistic. As
76. Id. at 45. Bingham made a similar argument in Congress in 1857: "[T]he great democratic
idea which [the Constitution] embodies, that all men, before the law, are equal in respect of
those rights of person which God gives and no man or State may rightfully take away, except
as aforfeiture for crime." CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (Feb. 11, 1859) (statement of
Rep. John Bingham) (emphasis added), reprinted in TENBROEK, supra note 70, app. D at
340.
77. As Weld wrote to Garrison: "I infer that the Society is based upon the great bottom law of
human right, that nothing but crime can forfeit liberty." See ROBERT H. ABZUG, PASSIONATE
LIBERATOR: THEODORE DWIGHT WELD AND THE DILEMMA OF REFORM 88 (1980) (quoting
Letter from Theodore Dwight Weld to William Lloyd Garrison (Jan. 2, 1833)).
78. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF NEW ENGLAND ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY pmbl. (1832) ("[E]very
person, of full age and sane mind, has a right to immediate freedom from personal bondage
of whatsoever kind, unless imposed by the sentence of the law for the commission of some
crime."); RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1837-1860, at 353 (1976) (quoting an 1859 Minnesota editorial arguing that
the Republican Party must ensure "that not a chain shall clank nor a whip crack over human
beings guilty of no crime"); George B. Cheever, The Slaves Are Free by Virtue of the Rebellion
and the Government Is Bound To Protect Them, N.Y. INDEP., Jan. 16, 1862, reprinted in THE
RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-70, at 31, 36-37 (Harold M. Hyman ed.,
1967).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
8o. WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 177.
81. Id.; see also id. at 174; id. at 176 ("[T]he Thirteenth Amendment expressly permitted
prisoners to be reduced to the status of slaves . . . ."). The Amendment imitated familiar
language in the Northwest Ordinance, which also contained a crime exception. See, e.g.,




Whitman recognized, the Thirteenth Amendment's simultaneous elimination
and preservation of involuntary servitude was intuitive and not ironic in the
Reconstruction era. Whereas racial slavery was an unjustifiable punishment,
those "duly convicted" of crime might be-and, in fact, for many decades
would be-sold into the service of private industrial interests and so forced to
labor without pay.81
About a month after passing the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress enacted
a wartime measure that explicitly connected the Amendment's contractarian
philosophy of formal equality with voting rights. Under the Federal Deserter
Act, Civil War deserters who failed to return to service by May of 1865 were
deemed to have "voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of
citizenship," including the right to vote.8 In July 1866, the provision's
constitutionality was upheld in Huber v. Reily, a widely reported Pennsylvania
Supreme Court case."s Both the federal statute and the Huber decision
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the
punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted . . . ."); CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., ist Sess. 1488 (Apr. 8, 1864) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner)
(discussing the Northwest Ordinance); cf MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE
CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 56-57
(summarizing legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment's crime exception); Kamal
Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment Clause and Sexual Slavery,
55 UCLA L. REV. 607, 625-32 (20o8) (same). Faced with racist exploitation of the
Amendment's crime exception, Congress later considered eliminating all slavery by statute.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 344-45 (Jan. 8, 1867).
82. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871) ("[The criminal] has, as a consequence
of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the
law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State."); see also
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228 (2001) ("[F]or much of this country's history, the
prevailing view was that a prisoner was a mere 'slave of the state . . . .'); Ex parte Wilson,
114 U.S. 417, 429 (1884) ("Imprisonment at hard labor, compulsory and unpaid, is, in the
strongest sense of the words, 'involuntary servitude for crime,' spoken of in the provision of
the Ordinance of 1787, and of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, by which all
other slavery was abolished."); Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 317 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[I]nmates
sentenced to incarceration cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment claim if the prison
system requires them to work.").
83. See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK
AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (20o8); William Cohen, Negro
Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-194o: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31 (1976).
84. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 79, 13 Stat. 487, 490. On March ii, President Lincoln executed the
Act by proclamation. See Abraham Lincoln, Executive Proclamation 124: Offering Pardon to
Deserters (Mar. 11, 1865), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid
=70073.
85. See Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. 112, 116 (1866) ("Disenfranchisement of a citizen as a punishment
for crime is no unusual punishment ..... (citing Barker v. People, 20 Johns. (N.Y.) 457, 458
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expressly contemplated the forfeiture of voting rights through wrongdoing,
thereby exhibiting the contractarian political theory underlying so much
abolitionist thought. Huber also illustrates the two-sided character of the
antebellum period's egalitarian expansion of voting rights. As the Civil War
approached, more and more states loosened property qualifications and
expanded the franchise to include all white men. At the same time, a
countervailing pattern emerged: broad criminal disenfranchisement laws
increasingly became the national norm, particularly in Northern states."'
The Civil War tightened the link between military service and suffrage.
Many jurisdictions modified their residency and other voting requirements to
allow soldiers to vote, including by absentee ballot.1 And, as commentators
have long observed, the Fifteenth Amendment drew essential support from
arguments that black soldiers in the Union army had earned the ballot." But if
valiant citizens could earn enfranchisement through military service, then the
(1823) (holding disenfranchisement for dueling unlawful because dueling is not an
"infamous" crime))); see also Burkett v. McCarty, lo Bush (73 Ky.) 758, 762 (1866) ("So the
Legislature may rightfully forfeit a citizen's right to vote as a penalty for perjury or other
crime."); State v. Symonds, 57 Me. 148, 149-50 (1869) (finding error in the conviction of an
alleged deserter for voting, on the ground that the indictment alleged only illegal voting and
not desertion); cf Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865) (upholding state loyalty oath as a
nonpunitive regulation of the franchise); Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867) (same). The
serious questions in Huber and similar postwar disenfranchisement cases were whether the
punishment was ex post facto and whether criminal disfranchisement could constitutionally
be imposed on alleged deserters not convicted by court martial. Cf infra Subsection I.C.2
(discussing similar arguments raised in connection with Section 3).
86. See KEYSSAR, supra note 44, at So-51; MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 44, at 54 (noting the
"striking" fact that "almost all of the 19 states established after 1850 included both
near-universal white male suffrage and a law authorizing felon disenfranchisement").
8. See KEYSSAR, supra note 44, at 83.
88. Karlan, supra note 42; see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 984 (Feb. 8, 1869)
(statement of Sen. Edmund Ross) (deploring the view that former slaves "are good enough
to fight but not good enough to vote," whereas a rebel can "forswear his crime" and be
"reinvested with all the political privileges and prerogatives which his treason had
forfeited"); id. app. at 93 (Jan. 28, 1869) (statement of Rep. Benjamin Franklin
Whittemore); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 396-97
(2005) ("The story of black ballots begins with black bullets."); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE
RIGHT To VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 85 (1969)
("The importance and influence of this argument cannot be overstated."); Amar &
Brownstein, supra note 63, at 932-33 & n-48 (1998) ("Even an uneducated but loyal
emancipated slave had a more deserving claim to the right to vote than the traitors and
rebels who formed the major part of the white voting constituency in the south."). The
rhetorical link between "ballots" and "bullets" has a long history. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
ist Sess. 732 (Feb. 7, 1866) (statement of Rep. John Russell Kelso) (explaining that the freed
slaves "know enough to cast bullets with judgment, and I have no doubt but that they




logic of formal equality suggests that disloyalty should trigger punitive
exclusion from the body politic. Congress's 1865 deserter disenfranchisement
statute bears out that inference. With the Civil War not yet formally concluded
and the Thirteenth Amendment still pending ratification, the political
philosophy underlying American abolitionism was already being redirected
toward the right to vote.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
Today, the most visible component of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
Equal Protection Clause, a provision motivated by contractarian thought"# and
designed to promote formal equality.90 Still, the Equal Protection Clause
originally had a limited ambit. Plainly applicable to so-called "civil rights,"
such as property ownership and the right to contract, the predominant original
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause was that it did not apply to
"political rights," such as voting and office-holding." By affording Congress
power to secure the civil rights of former slaves, the Fourteenth Amendment
provided a constitutional basis for the foundational Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which itself included three separate crime exceptions."
8g. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385,
1435-36 (1992) (explaining that what the author called the Equal Protection Clause's subject,
"protection," was predicated on a contractarian view of government).
go. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 2459 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Thaddeus Stevens) ("Whatever law protects the white man shall afford 'equal' protection to
the black man. . . . Now different degrees of punishment are inflicted, not on account of the
magnitude of the crime, but according to the color of the skin.").
91. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 2542 (May 1o, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Bingham) ("The second section excludes the conclusion that by the first section suffrage is
subjected to congressional law . . . ."); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 195-96, 216-18 (1998) (collecting evidence); MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 126 (1987) ("Speaker after speaker lamented that blacks had not been given the vote
[in Section i]."); KLARMAN, supra note 44, at 29 (2004) ("The dominant understanding of
the amendment ultimately adopted was that it protected civil, not political, rights."). But see
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 57-58, 127-32 (1988) (collecting evidence against as well as in favor of
this view).
92. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27; id. S 2, 14 Stat. at 27; id. 5 4, 14 Stat.
at 28 ("[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State . . . .").
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Unlike the Equal Protection Clause in Section 1, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Sections 2 and 3 on their face did address political rights. The
Subsections that follow demonstrate that the irony of egalitarian
disenfranchisement is visible in the often-overlooked history of Section 2 and
the even more rarely examined history of Section 3. The philosophy of formal
equality that gave rise to the Equal Protection Clause in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment also led Congress to protect and engage in punitive
disenfranchisement in Sections 2 and 3.
i. Section 2
The North's victory in the Civil War ironically threatened to enhance the
South's political power within the Union.93 With slaves freed by the
Thirteenth Amendment, the original Constitution's infamous three-fifths
compromise had been broken. Freed slaves would henceforth count as whole
citizens for apportionment purposes. That meant that Southern states would
enjoy an increase in their number of congressional seats upon readmission to
the Union. Yet the former slaves had not been afforded the right to vote. As
Representative Eckley put it, "This present[ed] the anomaly of allowing five
million white rebels to represent four million loyal blacks . . . ."' Principle and
partisanship alike motivated congressional Republicans to avoid that
outcome.95
Congress began grappling with the apportionment problem in late 1865.
The most obvious solution was simply to enfranchise the former slaves,
thereby creating a new Republican voting bloc in the South. But sentiment in
the North was not yet thought to be supportive of black enfranchisement.96
93. See CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard) (explaining that the end of the three-fifths compromise would "increase the
number of... Representatives [from the once slaveholding states by] nine or ten").
94. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2535 (May lo, 1866) (statement of Rep. Ephraim
Eckley); see also id. at 2468 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. William Kelley) (deploring
that Southern rebels would include disfranchised blacks in the basis of representation and
so, in terms of congressional influence, "be the equal of three of the best and most patriotic"
Northerners); id. at 2508 (May 9, 1866) (statement of Rep. George Boutwell) (same); id. at
354 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. William Kelley) (same).
95. For a detailed account of Section 2's legislative history, see George David Zuckerman, A
Consideration of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
30 FORDHi-AML. REV. 93 (1961).
g6. Senator Howard again explains: "It was our opinion that three fourths of the States of this




Another early suggestion was to link apportionment to each state's number of
eligible voters." That approach had its own problems, however, including that
it would diminish the influence of New England states disproportionately
inhabited by women and aliens.' A voter-based approach would also have
penalized states like Missouri that had disenfranchised many former
Confederates." Republicans consequently decided on a third option: to
impose an apportionment penalty on racial disenfranchisement, so that
Southern states denying former slaves the right to vote would suffer a
proportional loss in representation. If the South enfranchised the former
slaves, then Republicans would see major electoral gains. And if not, the
Democrat-dominated South would lose representation as compared with the
Republican-dominated North. Either way, the Republicans' congressional
majority would be secure.'oo
In late January, Congress received language previously agreed to by the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction: "[W]henever the elective franchise shall
under any restriction, to the colored race." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2766 (May
23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard).
97. See CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 9-10 (Dec. 5, 1865) (statements of Reps. Robert
Schenck, Thaddeus Stevens, and John Broomall); see also id. at 1232 (Mar. 7, 1866)
(statement of Sen. James Doolittle); id. at 535 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. Robert
Schenck).
98. Many New England men migrating toward the West had been replaced by immigrants from
Europe. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 877 (Feb. 16, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Thomas Hendricks) ("Adopting the voting population, then, as the basis of representation
and taxation, the six great agricultural states of the West . . . would have the advantage of
New England by two or three representatives."); id. at 141 (Jan. 8, 1866) (statement of Rep.
James G. Blaine) (discussing regional implications of a voter basis); id. (statement of Rep.
Thaddeus Stevens) (pointing out that "the cause of this disparity of men and women in
Massachusetts and in the New England States" was "that the men go to the Western States
as emigrants"). The realization that apportionment by voters would shift power from East
to West "seems to have come as a shock to many" and doomed that approach. JOSEPH B.
JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 56-57 (1956); see also id. at 23, 61.
g. See CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (Dec. 17, 1866) (statement of Sen. Thomas
Hendricks) (pointing out that the "rebellion" exception in Section 2 solved this problem);
CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., Ist Sess. 1315 (Mar. 1o, 1866) (statement of Rep. Josiah Grinnell)
(identifying the implications of disenfranchising former Confederates under the voter-based
approach); id. at 1233 (Mar. 7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Henry Anthony) (discussing the
issue in relation to Tennessee); id. at 535-36 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Benjamin) (discussing the problem in relation to Missouri).
loo. See, e.g., JAMES,supra note 98, at ioi, 137. This penalty was criticized. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., ist Sess. app. at 119 (Feb. 14, 1866) (statement of Sen. John Henderson) (declaring
the disenfranchisement penalty "as inefficient as it is evasive"); id. at 357-358 (Jan. 22, 1866)
(statement of Rep. Roscoe Conkling) (submitting tables to criticize prior assessments of
how various proposals would influence regional representation in Congress).
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be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons
therein of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of
representation.""o' Because it penalized voting discrimination only when based
on "race or color," this proposal would have left the states free to
disenfranchise criminals without penalty. That outcome had widespread
support. Representative Bingham, the primary author of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Section 1, put the point succinctly: states lacked authority to
disenfranchise their residents "except as a punishment for their own crimes.'
Consistent with the contemporaneous views of other noted Republicans,"o3
Bingham drew on contractarian thought, explaining that "[a] citizen may
forfeit his right by crime, and the State may enforce that forfeiture."' Radical
Illinois Congressman John F. Farnsworth later made the same point about the
final version of Section 2, arguing that a legitimate government ruled by the
consent of the government "giv[es] to every citizen, white or black, who has
not forfeited the right by his crimes, the ballot.""' To describe formal equality
in the franchise was to acknowledge the propriety of criminal disenfranchisement.
The Committee's initial proposal failed in the Senate due to an unexpected
alliance between conservatives and extreme radical Republicans.' Led by
Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, the extreme radicals argued that by
merely penalizing racial disenfranchisement, the Committee version implied
that racial disenfranchisement was constitutional."o' Other leading Republicans
101. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 353 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Andrew Rogers);
BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 53-
54 (1914).
102. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. app. at 57 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Bingham).
103. See, e.g., George Washington Julian, Suffrage in the District of Columbia, Speech Before the
House of Representatives (Jan. 16, 1866), in JULIAN, SPEECHES ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS,
supra note 54, at 291, 292-93 (noting that society deems the right to vote "forfeited on certain
prescribed conditions" and that "in all free governments ... disfranchisement is
appropriately made a part of the punishment for high crimes").
104. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. app. at 57 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Bingham); see also CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3 d Sess. app. at 140 (Jan. i, 1857) (statement
of Rep. John Bingham) (proclaiming that "the rights of human nature belong to each
member of the State, and cannot be forfeited but by crime").
105. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2539 (May lo, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Farnsworth).
io6. See JAMES, supra note 98, at 64-75.
107. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. app. at 56-57 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep.
George Washington Julian) (referring to the proposed Section 2 as a "mere penalty against
its violation, which at least seems to imply the right to violate it, if the penalty shall be




disputed this point, o8 but Sumner adhered to his position. To punish racial
disenfranchisement as such, Sumner contended, would "crystallize into organic
law the disenfranchisement of a race."' 09 By contrast, even the original
Constitution had managed to avoid mentioning race.no Sumner elaborated his
views in one of his longest and most famous speeches."' Declaring that
"Equality [is] the Alpha and the Omega" and "insist[ing] that all shall be equal
before the law,"" Sumner elaborated a vision of suffrage predicated on
act-egalitarianism. Race was an illegitimate voting qualification because one's
race is "permanent" and "insurmountable."" Sumner concluded that "[c]olor
cannot be a 'qualification,' any more than size or the quality of [one's] hair."114
proposed amendment gave "constitutional sanction" to racial disenfranchisement); id. at 358
(Jan. 22, 1866) (Rep. Samuel Shellabarger) (expressing concern about "giving inferential
power to the states to exclude a race").
1o8. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., 1st Sess. 431-32 (Jan. 25, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Bingham) ("You place upon your statute-book a law punishing the crime of murder with
death. You do not thereby, by implication, say that anybody may, of right, commit
murder."); Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at 51-53; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
1255-56 (Mar. 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson) (saying of an apportionment
penalty triggered by racial disenfranchisement that "there is no implication in it, no
compromise in it, no surrender of this Government of any power whatever").
log. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 1224 (Mar. 7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner).
no. Id. at 682 (Feb. 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner) (arguing that the Founders
"concealed [slavery] from view by words which might mean something else"). David
Herbert Donald has suggested that Sumner's speech may have been motivated by
Massachusetts politics, not constitutional principle. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, Charles
Sumner and the Rights ofMan, in CHARLEs SUMNER 243-47, 261-65 (1996). But there is good
reason to take Sumner at his word. The Committee version received other criticism on the
ground Sumner identified. See supra note 1o7; see also FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 338-39 (1882) (recounting Douglass's support of Sumner's
great speech); HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THADDEUS STEVENS: NINETEENTH-CENTURY
EGALITARIAN 180 (1997). And several other ultra radicals who had opposed the race-based
apportionment penalty joined Sumner in voting for the final version of Section 2. See
DONALD, supra, at 263; see also infra notes 147-148 and accompanying text (noting that
Congress and the Supreme Court would later draw a similar negative inference from Section
2's inapplicability to gendered voting rules).
il. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 673-87 (Feb. 6, 1866). For another extended discussion
in the same vein, see id. at 1224-32 (Mar. 7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
n12. Id. at 68o, 685 (Feb. 6, 1866).
113. Id. at 684.
114. Id.; see CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 986 (Feb. 8, 1869) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner) (explaining, during Fifteenth Amendment debates, that "qualifications" are things
attainable by effort); see also Julian, supra note 54, at 120 ("You might as well disfranchise
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In contrast, "[n]obody doubts" the legitimacy of excluding "persons of
infamous life.""s Sumner made clear that restrictions triggered by "infamous
life"-as well as by "age," "residence," and perhaps "education" -"do not in
any way interfere with the right of suffrage, for they leave it absolutely accessible
to all.""6 Sumner would repeat this point in later colloquies, emphasizing his
support of disenfranchisement for "crime."" 7 In this way, Sumner's radical
critique incorporated an argument from formal equality justifying criminal
disenfranchisement." 8
After the Committee version's failure in the Senate, legislators proposed the
elimination of Section 2's reference to disenfranchisement "on account of race"
in favor of an apportionment penalty for disenfranchising adult males." 9
Whereas the old draft had a "negative" structure in that it expressly penalized
only racial disenfranchisement, the new drafts exhibited an "affirmative"
structure. That is, the new Section 2 would penalize all forms of
disenfranchisement, subject only to a few identified exceptions, such as age and
sex. It was at this time that the exception for crime emerged. On March 12, in
the wake of the Committee version's failure in the Senate, Iowa's Senator
Grimes, a member of the Committee, introduced text that would have
exempted disenfranchisement for "crime or disloyalty." 2 o Almost immediately
thereafter, Sumner advanced a similar text proposing that the
disenfranchisement of Confederate rebels be exempted from penalty. 2 1
the emigrant for the size of his head, the length of his arm, the virtues or vices of his
neighbors, or the height of our mountains.").
115. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 685 (Feb. 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
n6. Id. In a later speech, Sumner noted that property qualifications might be surmountable if
not "unreasonably large," but nonetheless considered "even" those qualifications
unrepublican. See id. at 1230 (Mar. 7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
117. Id. app. at 121 (Feb. 14, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
18. See CONG. GLOBE, 4 0th Cong., 3d Sess. 902 (Feb. 5, 1869) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner) ("If the prescribed 'qualification' were color of the hair or color of the eyes, all
would see its absurdity. . . . Are we not reminded that the leopard cannot change his spots
or the Ethiopian his skin?" (paraphrasing Jeremiah, 13:23)); DONALD, supra note 11o, at 353.
Sumner then said of Section 2: "Such is the penalty imposed by the Constitution on a State
which denies the right to vote, except in a specific case." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
903. (Feb. 5, 1869) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
ng. Seegenerally JAMES, supra note 98, at loo-16.
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 1320 (Mar. 12, 1866).
121. Id. at 1321; see also Charles Sumner, The National Security and the National Faith, Speech at
Worcester (Sept. 14, 1865), in CHARLES SUMNER, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
NATIONAL FAITH: GUARANTEES FOR THE NATIONAL FREEDMAN AND THE NATIONAL CREDITOR
(Boston, Rand & Avery 1865) ("As those who have fought against us should be




Echoing other radicals concerned that Southerners might abuse criminal and
other disqualifications to oppress black voters,m' Sumner argued that his
approach was not "open . . . to any evasions.""' He also emphasized that his
proposed measure avoided implicitly condoning racial disenfranchisement."2
These proposals, among others, were then referred to the Committee.
By April, the Committee was considering an entirely reworked version of
the Fourteenth Amendment known as the Owen proposal.' This proposal still
included a negatively structured apportionment penalty for states that engaged
in racial disenfranchisement and so closely resembled the version that had
failed in the Senate. The Committee then switched to an affirmatively
structured measure akin to the ones Grimes and Sumner had proposed in the
Senate, with Oregon Senator George Williams proposing a "rebellion or other
crime" exception that closely paralleled the one suggested by Grimes. After
discussion" (the contents of which unfortunately went unrecorded), the
proposed substitution passed in the Committee12 7  and, with small
modifications, went on to become Section 2: "[W]hen the right to vote at any
election for" a federal office "is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced. . . .""
122. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 383 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Farnsworth) ("We adopted an amendment to the Constitution that slavery should not
hereafter exist in this country except as a punishment for crime. Yet we find those states
reducing these men to slavery again ... for every little petty offense ... . They may provide
that no man shall exercise the elective franchise who has been guilty of a crime; and then
they may denounce these men as guilty of a crime for every little, imaginary, petty
offense."); see also id. at 4o6 (Jan. 24, 1866) (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger)
(anticipating grandfather clauses in arguing that a penalty for racial disenfranchisement
might not reach "a provision disfranchising all who were slaves, or all whose ancestors were
slaves"); id. at 376 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Thomas Jenckes); id. at. 359 (Jan. 22,
1866) (statement of Rep. Roscoe Conkling); cf infra Section I.D (discussing similar
concerns during debates on the Reconstruction Acts).
123. Id. at 1321 (Mar. 12, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
124. Id. ("[I]t contains no words which can imply any recognition of the right of a State to
disfranchise on account of color or race; and therefore seems to meet the objections which
were adduced against the pending proposition [i.e., the House's proposed amendment].").
125. See NELSON, supra note 91, at 55-60.
126. See KENDRICK, supra note ioi, at 1o2; see also JAMES, supra note 98, at 112.
127. See KENDRICK, supra note oi, at 1o2.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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Judges and commentators often lament that there was no recorded
explanation for the sudden shift toward Williams's proposed language, which
avoided any express mention of race and included the fateful exemption for
disenfranchisement on account of "crime." But the legislative history
suggests an answer: the Committee adopted Williams's approach to avoid
Sumner's earlier critique and thereby ensure the Amendment's passage in the
Senate."o By striking at racial disenfranchisement only by negative implication
(that is, without explicitly mentioning race), the new language accorded with
Sumner's stated views and, in fact, imitated Sumner's own proposal. Sumner
later acknowledged as much.131 The desire to appease ultraradicals also explains
why the Amendment's supporters were at pains to distinguish the new
approach from the old one when advancing their case in the Senate."' It is true
that the new proposal included a crime exemption even though Sumner's
proposal had not; but the Committee likely felt comfortable with that revision
because the exception accorded with Sumner's repeated endorsements of
disenfranchisement for both rebellion and crime. At this time, Congress was
not swayed by the concerns of Sumner and others that Southerners might
exploit criminal disenfranchisement for racist ends. The Committee's
calculations proved accurate, as Sumner and a sufficient number of like-minded
colleagues voted for the revised version of Section 2, including its "other crime"
exemption. Congress thus satisfied the extreme radicals in the Senate while
taking care to preserve constitutional space for criminal disenfranchisement.
129. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 44 (1974).
130. Sumner said that his earlier critique applied with equal force to the similar Owen proposal
and that he was prepared to vote against the amendment yet again: "I must do my duty,"
Sumner explained, "without looking to consequences." See JAMES, supra note 98, at 1o1-02;
see also ERIC L. McKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 337-39, 340-41 (1988)
(discussing Sumner's role in the making of Section 2, including the failure of the House
version).
131. When he understood another Senator to be arguing that Section 2 established the
constitutionality of racial voting requirements, Sumner leapt to his feet. See CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (Feb. 8, 1869) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner) ("We did
defeat [the House draft], and on that ground; that it conceded to the States the power to
discriminate against colored persons. . . . Then this article was brought forward, and it was
sustained on that avowed ground, that it did no such thing.").
132. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3033-34 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. John
Henderson) (explaining that the final draft, unlike the earlier negatively structured one, did
not "admit in express terms the right of the States to exclude from suffrage on account of
color" and would apply to "disenfranchisement of white and black, unless excluded" by the
exception for rebellion or other crime); see also id. at 2463 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep.
James Garfield) ("I believe the section is now free from the objections that killed it in the




Besides indicating that Sumner's formal-equality arguments influenced
Section 2's final form, the provision's drafting history also suggests that the
"other crime" exception was the product of deliberate legislative craftsmanship.
Again, the Committee borrowed Grimes's proposal, despite the ready
availability of Sumner's proposal, which had lacked a crime exception.
Williams later proposed and discussed an amendment concerning the use of
the phrase "the right to vote," as well as the provision's precise way of
identifying affected elections."' Senator Reverdy Johnson discussed how
Section 2 might affect municipal elections, which were deliberately left
unaffected.' Wilson proposed a substitute designed to clarify the provision's
reference to citizenship but that also omitted any reference to a crime
exception. 135 Congress adopted Wilson's "inhabitant" language, but rejected
the remainder of Wilson's proposal and thereby preserved the crime
exception." Some commentators insist that the Fourteenth Amendment was
carelessly drafted, 1 7 but even the incomplete record available demonstrates that
virtually every word in Section 2 was weighed, debated, and voted on. It is fair
to infer that the "other crime" exception was deliberate.
Some radicals condemned Section 2 as a half-measure, but even they
endorsed criminal disenfranchisement.13 On one end of the spectrum,
Congressman (and future President) James A. Garfield supported Section 2
while regretting that Congress had not "come out on the plain, unanswerable
proposition that every adult intelligent citizen of the United States,
133. See id. at 2991 (June 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. George Williams).
134. Id. at 3027 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Reverdy Johnson); id. at 2991; see also id. at
3029-30 (statement of Sen. George Williams) (stating that the Amendment was not
intended to apply to municipal elections and proposing language to clarify that point).
13s. Id. at 2770 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson).
136. Id. at 2897 (May 30, 1866).
137. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 14, at 292 ("[W] e should not expect too much from the drafters of
these amendments .... ).
138. See FONER, supra note 49, at 255 (noting that Wendell Phillips wrote to Stevens that the
Amendment was a "fatal and total surrender"); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 355
(1964) (quoting Frederick Douglass's argument that, under the Amendment, he was "a
citizen to . . . obey the laws, support the government, and fight the battles of the country,
but, in all that respects voting and representation, I am but as so much inert matter"); cf
WENDELL PHILLIPS, Address after the Assassination of President Lincoln (Apr. 23, 1865), in
2 SPEECHES, LECTURES, AND LETTERS 446, 451 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1894) ("My rule is,
any citizen liable to be hanged for crime is entitled to vote for rulers.").
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unconvicted of crime, shall enjoy the right of suffrage."" 9 Others were less
restrained. Perhaps the most robust critique came in the form of a pamphlet by
renowned abolitionist George B. Cheever.o4 0 The pamphlet began with the
contractarian premise that government, here the federal government, has an
obligation to protect the rights of persons loyal to it.'4 ' Cheever then argued
that the apportionment penalty had ceded to the states authority over federal
voting rights, such that the states "can at their pleasure forbid you from voting
for the United States Government."'4 ' This was intolerable, for "no State can
disfranchise a citizen of the United States" and the "right to do so for anything
but crime would be the right to enslave him." 43 Cheever referenced the
permissibility of criminal disenfranchisement throughout the tract, even as he
inveighed against the Fourteenth Amendment for being insufficiently
progressive -indeed, for being retrogressive.'4
Section 2 bitterly disappointed radicals for another reason: its
apportionment penalty was limited to the disenfranchisement of twenty-one-
year-old "male" inhabitants, thereby introducing gender discrimination into
the Constitution."' Because Section 2 allowed states to disenfranchise women
without incurring any penalty, suffragists feared that Section 2 might be read
to endorse not just criminal disenfranchisement but also gender-based suffrage
restrictions. Some modern commentators have thought that interpretive
possibility absurd,'14 but the suffragists' fears proved well-founded.
139. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2462 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. James A.
Garfield).
140. GEORGE B. CHEEVER, THE REPUBLIC OR THE OLIGARCHY? WHICH? (New York, 1866).
141. See, e.g., id. at 334-35.
142. Id. at 335.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., id. at 6 ("Shall their rights be protected, or shall they be taken away, without crime,
by reason of the color of their skin? . . . And for this purpose shall the Constitution be so
amended as to give the rebel States the power of disfranchising, without crime, on account
of color or race?").
145. See generally Nina Morais, Note, Sex Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: Lost
History, 97 YALE L.J. 1153, iSS-63 (1988) (describing efforts to eliminate gender-based
suffrage restrictions in the Amendment).
146. See Ely, supra note 45, at 1195 n-45 ("The list of exemptions from the representation-
reduction sanction of Section 2 was patently not regarded as a listing of what was or was not





Congressmen'4 7 and, ultimately, the Supreme Court"' viewed Section 2'S use
of the term "male" as evidence that gender-based voting qualifications were
originally understood to be compatible with the Fourteenth Amendment's
Section 1. That textual inference finds historical support. As discussed below,
Congress deliberately exempted gendered voting rules so as to permit them to
remain in place without penalty. And since gender (like race) is an inherited
status, Section 2's inapplicability to gendered voting restrictions demonstrates
that Congress did not accept the full implications of formal equality.
Republicans who defended gendered voting rules generally raised two
types of argument. First, they argued that disenfranchising women preserved
their virtue by insulating them from politics and the responsibilities of
governance, particularly military service. Second, they argued that women's
interests, unlike the interests of oppressed Southern blacks, were already
represented by their sons, fathers, brothers, and husbands. In other words,
women were different from men, and gender was different from race.'49 These
arguments were plainly in tension with Republicans' formal-equality
arguments for black enfranchisement. Indeed, each argument had its racial
cousin, as Southerners argued that blacks were by nature incapable of ruling
themselves'50 and that their interests were protected by their white masters'
yet Republicans had rejected those arguments under the banner of equality
147. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 42-21, at 4 (1872) (statement of Sen. Matthew Carpenter) (providing
robust discussion and noting "the right of female suffrage is inferentially denied by the
second section of fourteenth amendment").
148. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 174 (1875) ("[I]f [women] were necessarily voters
because of their citizenship unless clearly excluded, why inflict the penalty for the exclusion
of males alone?").
149. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (Dec. 11, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Frederick Frelinghuysen) (arguing that "the women of America vote by faithful and true
representatives, their husbands, their brothers, their sons" and that women "do not bear the
bayonet, and have not that reason why they should be entitled to the ballot"); id. at 56 (Dec.
11, 1866) (statement of Sen. George Williams) (arguing that "the sons defend and protect
the reputation and rights of their mothers; husbands defend and protect the reputation and
rights of their wives; brothers defend and protect the reputation and rights of their sisters");
id. at 40 (Dec. lo, 1866) (statement of Sen. Lot M. Morrill) (arguing that "the ballot is the
inseparable concomitant of the bayonet"); see also id. at 64 (Dec. 11, 1866) (statement of
Democratic Sen. Reverdy Johnson) (arguing that men should have exclusive right of
suffrage because they "may be called upon to defend the country in time of war or in time
of insurrection").
15o. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 982 (Feb. 8, 1869) (statement of Sen. Adonijah
Welch) (summarizing the position of those opposed to extending suffrage).
151. Cf CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. app. at 121 (Feb. 14, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Charles Sumner) (rejecting the argument).
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before the law. 152 Recognizing that the Republicans were caught in an
embarrassing contradiction, suffragists and strategically motivated
conservatives pressed their advantage. They proposed women's
enfranchisement not just during debates on Section 2,"s but also during
debates on the District of Columbia suffrage bill' 5 4-which, as enacted,
enfranchised blacks, was limited by the term "male," and disenfranchised not
only those who had "voluntarily" aided the rebellion, but also those who had
been convicted of "any infamous crime or offence."'s
Yet the "other crime" exception was viewed differently from Section 2's use
of the term "male." Consistent with the view that gender is a mere status,
radical Republican feminists -not an insignificant group in the Reconstruction
era-made clear that they had accepted Section 2's gendered language only
because it was necessary to secure the measure's enactment and ratification.
These figures hoped to postpone consideration of women's rights in favor of a
more urgent and attainable goal. As the suffragist-abolitionist Wendell Phillips
famously put it, "This hour belongs to the negro."1" Lucy Stone would echo
that sentiment as late as January 1869, when she scuttled hopes for women's
enfranchisement in the District of Columbia by announcing, "Woman must
wait for the negro.""'5 In Congress, Republicans who endorsed women's
suffrage while accepting its postponement included not just Stevens and
Sumner, but also Anthony, Fowler, Julian, Wade, Warner, Wilson, and
Yates.1,8 Capturing this sentiment in 1866, Wade announced his support for
152. See CARRIE CHAPMAN CATT & NETTIE ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND POLITICS:
THE INNER STORY OF THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 43 (1923) ("Every argument which could be
made for Negro suffrage applied to women. There was no escaping that fact.").
153. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 379-80 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. James
Brooks).
154. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (Dec. lo, 1866) (statement of Sen. Edgar
Cowan).
155. See Act ofJan. 8, 1867, ch. 6, 14 Stat. 375.
156. Wendell Phillips, Thirty-Second Anniversary of the American National Anti-Slavery
Society, Address Before the New England Anti-Slavery Society (May 9, 1865), in NAT'L
ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, May 13, 1865, at 2.
157. FAYE E. DUDDEN, FIGHTING CHANCE: THE STRUGGLE OVER WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND BLACK
SUFFRAGE IN RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA 165 (2011).
158. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56 (Dec. 11, 1866) (statement of Sen. Henry
Anthony) ("The time has not come for it, but the time is coming."); id. at 63 (statement of
Sen. Richard Yates) ("I am for suffrage by females ... but that is not the point before us.");
JAMES, supra note 98, at 66 (noting that "Stevens took care to explain his personal
opposition to the word 'male"'); 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 91 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., Rochester, N.Y., Charles Mann




the enfranchisement of "every person of mature age and discretion who has
committed no crime," including women."' "I know that the time will come,"
Wade said of women's enfranchisement, "not to-day, but the time is
approaching.""so During later debates on the Fifteenth Amendment,
Republicans would try to make good on Wade's promise by proposing
women's enfranchisement.161
Republicans' decision to elevate politics over principle during the 186os
had lasting effects on the women's suffrage movement. Before the passage of
Section 2, Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton opposed all
legislation based on "class or caste, pleaded that Republicans exhibit
"logical consistency,",6 3 and argued that "[t]he same logic and justice that
secures suffrage to one class gives it to all.",164 Even after the Amendment
passed, leading suffragists continued to denounce Section 2 while
distinguishing guiltless women from criminals. 6s But a rhetorical and
using the term "male," but found that "it could not be done"); GEORGE WASHINGTON
JULIAN, POLITICAL RECOLLECTIONS, 1840-1872, at 325 (1884); NELSON, supra note 91, at
137-38 (noting that even supporters of women's rights acknowledged the need to postpone
the women's suffrage question); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 862 (Feb. 4,
1869) (statement of Sen. Willard Warner) ("I would admit woman .... But I know that
woman's suffrage is not now attainable, and I would not, as a practical legislator, jeopardize
the good which is attainable by linking with it that which is impossible."); id. at 670 (Jan.
28, 1869) (statement of Sen. Joseph S. Fowler).
159. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (Dec. ii, 1866).
160. Id. at 63.
161. See infra Section I.E.
162. Petition of Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. to Congress, reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
ist Sess. 380 (Jan. 23, 1866).
163. Letter of Susan B. Anthony to Congress (Jan. 20, 1866), reprinted in CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 380 (Jan. 23, 1866).
164. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, This Is the Negro's Hour, NAT'L ANTISLAVERY STANDARD (Dec. 26,
1865).
165. For example, the Resolutions of the Equal Rights Convention in New York City, published
December 7, 1866, prominently endorsed universal adult enfranchisement, including for
blacks and women-but only for those "not legally convicted of crime." 2 THE SELECTED
PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 3 (Ann D. Gordon et al. eds.,
2003). And in 1867, Elizabeth Cady Stanton routinely distinguished between female and
criminal disenfranchisement. In a January 23 address, she stated, "How humiliating ... for
respectful and law-abiding women . .. to be thrust outside the pale of political consideration
with those convicted of . .. infamous crime." Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Speech Before the
New York State Legislature (Jan. 23, 1867), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE,
supra note 158, at 275. Similarly, in her May 9 Address to the First Anniversary of the
American Equal Rights Association, Stanton deplored that women had been "thrust outside
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philosophical change was already becoming apparent. As Garrett Epps has
observed:
[I]n the wake of what they saw as male betrayal, Anthony, Stanton, and
their allies began to argue that women needed the ballot -and deserved
it - not because they were human, but because they were female. Not
only would voting be a means of self-protection; it would elevate the
political process by bringing the influence of women-purer, nobler,
and more peaceable-into public life.' 66
In other words, suffragists increasingly associated virtue with a status-
namely, the status of being a woman.'"' This argumentative shift fostered
discussion of the distinctive cultural and economic obstacles to women's
enfranchisement, but it also created room for racist and classist rhetoric to
become more prominent in the women's rights movement. 68 Suffragists' move
toward status-based reasoning is a reminder that formal equality was not the
only philosophy capable of supporting egalitarian reform during the
mid-nineteenth century.
In sum, Republicans' accommodation of gendered voting distinctions
stood in marked contrast to their inclusion of the crime exception.
Reconstruction progressives, including at least a substantial bloc of leading
Republicans, viewed Section 2's reference to gender as a concession to political
necessity. In contrast, the crime exception was viewed as principled, even
among the era's most radical proponents of broad voting rights.
2. Section 3
In the spring and summer of 1866, the nation debated whether Southern
Confederates should be disenfranchised by constitutional amendment. The
the pale of political consideration with traitors, idiots, minors, with those guilty of bribery,
larceny, and infamous crime." Id. at 189.
166. GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR
EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 219 (20o6); see also ELLEN CAROL DuBois,
FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 174-79 (1978) (discussing changes and divisions in the women's
suffrage movement caused by Section 2 and subsequent debates over the Fifteenth
Amendment); IEYSSAR, supra note 44, at 143-45 (same); AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF
THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 44-45 (1965) (same).
167. Some Republicans raised early versions of these arguments against defenders of Section 2.
see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (Dec. 11, 1866) (statement of Sen. Henry
Anthony) (asserting that women were not "less virtuous," but "more" so).




House passed a version of the Fourteenth Amendment that included a
provision, then designated Section 3, that would have excluded Confederates
from federal elections until 1870.169 The effect would have been to
disenfranchise much of the white Southern population. This measure was
widely viewed as a serious obstacle to successful national reunification and
sparked a strongly negative reaction in May 1866, not just in the South but also
in many quarters of the North.o17 That version of Section 3 was promptly and
almost unanimously rejected by the Senate. Moderates then proposed
substitute language that would have excluded from federal and state office
persons who had taken a governmental oath of loyalty to the Union before
joining or aiding the Confederacy.17 ' This alternative quickly passed in the
Senate and the House and is now Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 72
The idea behind Section 3 arose during the Civil War. When he accepted
his nomination as the 1864 Republican vice-presidential candidate, Andrew
Johnson argued that "the traitor has ceased to be a citizen, and in joining the
rebellion has become a public enemy." 73 Johnson further reasoned that the
traitor "forfeited his right to vote with loyal men when he renounced his
citizenship."7 But Johnson changed his attitude toward the South after
Lincoln's assassination and his own ascension to the presidency, as evidenced
169. The House proposal read: "Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, all persons who
voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, shall be excluded
from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress and for electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 2545 (May lo,
1866); see also JAMES, supra note 98, at 115-16 (discussing Committee proposal); id. at 131
(discussing passage in the House).
170. For example, the New York Times published a steady stream of editorials inveighing against
the House version and, ultimately, praising the Senate version. See, e.g., Editorial, The
Constitutional Amendment in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1866, at 4; Editorial, Who Would
Defeat and Destroy the Union Party?, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1866, at 4; Editorial, Bad Temper
and Worse Taste, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1866, at 4; Editorial, The Reconstruction Committee's
Amendment in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1866, at 4; Editorial, The Radicals and
Restoration, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1866, at 4; Editorial, Reconstruction- The Proposed
Amendment to the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1866, at 4; Beginning of the Reconstruction
Discussion in the House, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 1866, at 1.
171. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2869 (May 29, 1866) (introduction of near-final
language in Senate).
172. See id. at 3149 (June 13, 1866) (Senate passage); FONER, supra note 49, at 254-
173. Andrew Johnson, Speech, Nashville, Tenn. (June 9, 1864), in EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE
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by his controversial spate of presidential pardons to former Confederates.17 s
Indeed, Johnson issued increasingly broad orders providing executive clemency
for rebels. These actions flew in the face of Republican ideology, not only
because they insulated wrongdoers from punishment but also because these
clemency actions were discretionary judgments often based on little more than
flattery.617 As Whitman has noted, "it is characteristic of the American legal
culture that the pardoning power [has] faced bitter opposition-and
distinctively egalitarian opposition. Johnson's pardons to former
Confederates fit within that pattern.
The Fourteenth Amendment provided a vehicle for Republicans to punish
Confederates in a degrading but uniform fashion while circumventing
Johnson's confounding pardon power. Proponents of broad Confederate
disenfranchisement reasoned with reference to formal equality, often by
alluding to Johnson's earlier remarks. For example, on May 10, 1866, Senator
James Nye of the newly admitted state of Nevada quoted -and emphatically
agreed with-Johnson's 1864 speech.17 Nye's arguments paralleled
then-popular justifications for criminal disenfranchisement. Over and again,
Republicans insisted that rebels and criminals alike were self-declared "public
enemies" who had implicitly "forfeited" their political rights.17  Section 2's
"rebellion, or other crime" phraseology evidenced this reasoning by
demonstrating that "rebellion" is itself one type of "crime." This point called to
mind contemporaneous debates in which the South's allies likened Southerners
175. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 545
(1982); see, e.g., Thomas Nast, Andrew Johnson's Reconstruction, HARPER'S WKLY., Sept. 1,
1866 (cartoon).
176. See WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 181-85 (discussing post-Civil War pardons, among others);
see also id. at 184 ("Pardons, it was argued, were inevitably inegalitarian. . .
177. Id. at 181.
178. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2523 (May lo, 1866) (statement of Sen. James Nye)
("Sir, human lips never uttered a more striking truth than that.").
179. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 4 0th Cong., 3d Sess. 1013 (Feb. 8, 1869) (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard) (arguing that rebels should never be allowed to participate in government because
they had committed "the double crime of perjury and treason"); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3o56 (June 11, 1868) (statement of Sen. Charles Drake) ("We would disfranchise
rebels for crime against their country."); CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. app. at 257(July 9, 1866) (statement of Rep. Jehu Baker) ("Punishment should be visited upon so great
a public crime as the late rebellion."); id. at 792 (Feb. lo, 1866) (statement of Rep. Thomas
Williams) (arguing that the government "might well disfranchise individuals, such as the
traitors themselves, for an enormous crime"); id. at 781 (statement of Rep. Hamilton Ward)





to George Washingtonso while Unionists condemned Confederates as
criminals and distinguished them from America's beloved revolutionary
fathers.
When Congress debated Section 3, the main point of contention was
whether rebellion and treason should be considered a type of crime. In other
words, the common ground generally taken for granted was the propriety of
disenfranchising criminals, and the principal dispute was whether rebels and
traitors fell within that commonly accepted category. Thus Representative
Andrew Rogers of New Jersey, a Democrat who sat on the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, argued on behalf of the South that traditional crimes were
morally worse than rebellion: "Rebellion or revolution never has been
considered by the civilized world," he argued, "as having that odiousness and
moral turpitude that attaches to men for the commission of he[in]ous
crimes."" Rogers viewed Confederates as "political convicts" formerly
engaged in an honorable act of war unlike the dishonorable actions of common
criminals.'
Perhaps sensing that Republicans did not share Rogers's sanguine view of
the Confederate war machine, some of the South's allies advanced more
nuanced arguments. "Treason is undoubtedly a crime," admitted
Representative Benjamin Boyer, a Democrat from Pennsylvania and another
opponent of the Fourteenth Amendment.84 "But you cannot make new laws
and a new Constitution" just to punish traitors.as' In Boyer's view,
Confederates could not legitimately be punished by a "bill of attainder or ex
i8o. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., ist Sess. 355 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Andrew
J. Rogers) (arguing that Missouri's disenfranchisement of Confederates was a "burning
disgrace" and insinuating that Southerners could look to George Washington when
invoking "the right of revolution").
181. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, REVOLUTION AGAINST FREE GOVERNMENT NOT A RIGHT BUT
A CRIME (New York, Union League Club 1864).
182. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2539 (May so, 1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, 4 oth Cong.,
3 d Sess. 1029 (Feb. 9, 1869) (statement of Sen. George Vickers) (proposing that the
Fifteenth Amendment forbid disenfranchisement for "participation in the recent rebellion").
183. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2539 (May 1o, 1866) (statement of Rep. Andrew
Rogers) ("[Confederates] are not murderers, they are not thieves, they are not felons; they
are simply political convicts . . . ."); Cf WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 125-31 (discussing
European treatment of high-class political convicts).
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post facto law such as is provided in the amendment before the House."'8" This
line of attack had previously been raised against the Section 2 apportionment
penalty, as well as against a rebel disenfranchisement provision applicable to
the District of Columbia.'"' Even the Supreme Court expressed concern about
allegedly ex post facto Reconstruction measures. As Senator Hendricks put
it: "Now, sir, you say that these people have been in rebellion, that they have
committed a great crime, which I agree to."'"' But, Hendricks argued, the
South had suffered punishment through defeat in war, and any additional legal
sanctions would be ex post facto. 9o
In calling Section 3 a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, Boyer and other
conservatives 19' were contrasting the disputed practice of disenfranchising
Confederates with the concededly legitimate practice of disenfranchising
criminals. Because people cannot change who they are or what they have done
in the past, the government acts unfairly when it punishes individuals based on
their identity (in violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause) or based on conduct
that was legal at the time it was undertaken (in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause)."' If an oppressive government used bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws to divest disfavored classes of political power, then "no one, howsoever
virtuous his conduct, would be safe."' In contrast, a prospectively applicable
criminal law provides notice as to a standard of conduct and so allows people to
choose either to obey or to transgress. Critics observed that these commonplace
protections, hallmarks of formal equality, were absent from retroactive efforts
186. Id. After quoting the Ex Post Facto Clause, Boyer said, "That single prohibition is in itself a
complete answer to all that has been said in support" of Section 3. Id.
187. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (Dec. 1o, 1866) (statement of Sen. Edgar Cowan)
(arguing that the disenfranchisement of rebels in the District of Columbia would violate
"the plain provisions of the Constitution which forbid bills of attainder and which forbid ex
post facto laws").
88. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) (relying, in part, on the Ex Post Facto Clause to
invalidate an oath limiting federal legal practice to persons who had neither fought for nor
held office in the Confederacy).
189. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 879 (Feb. 16, 1866) (statement of Sen. Thomas
Hendricks).
19o. Id.
191. See, e.g., Editorial, The Constitutional Amendment in the Senate, supra note 170 (endorsing
Doolittle's critique of Section 3 as "retroactive legislation").
192. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203,
210 (1996) ("Without the nonattainder principle, the legislature could simply single out its
enemies -or the politically unpopular -and condemn them for who they are, or for what
they have done in the past and can no longer change.").




to punish rebels, including (but not only) the House version of Section 3. The
foregoing points were tailor-made to appeal to moderate Republicans, many of
whom had heard their colleagues raising similar arguments to condemn racial
disenfranchisement. 194
The radical position on Section 3 eked out a victory in the House. On June
20, 1866, the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction concluded that
the Confederates had "voluntarily renounced the right to representation, and
disqualified themselves by crime from participating in the government."'s In
support of that conclusion, some argued that the Confederates were the worst
kind of criminal.196 For example, Representative Eckley distinguished between
crimes "committed against property" and the crime "of treason," which is
committed "against the nation, against the whole people" and so is "the highest
[offense] known to the law.""' While expressly endorsing criminal
disenfranchisement,'9' Eckley emphasized that "[t]he only objection" to be
made against Section 3 was "that it does not go far enough.""' Underscoring
the need to treat rebels harshly, Ecldey added, "I would disfranchise them
forever."200
The climactic statement on Confederate disenfranchisement came from
radical leader Thaddeus Stevens. In a widely reprinted speech, Stevens
194. See, e.g., Cheever et al., Petition, reprinted in THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND
RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1870, supra note 78, at 273, 280-83 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1967)
(arguing that racial disenfranchisement constituted an "attainder of color" as well as an ex
post facto law). Cheever also argued that racial disenfranchisement was a potential means of
reintroducing slavery in violation of "the amendment of the Constitution, forbidding slavery
except for crime." Id. at 281.
195. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. No. 39-30, at Xix
(1866), available at http://www.archive.org/details/jointreconstructoocongrich.
196. See supra note 179 (collecting sources).
197. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2535 (May io, 1866) (statement of Rep. Ephraim
Ecldey).
198. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 46 (1974) (quoting Eckley's statements on general
criminal disenfranchisement).
199. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 2535-36 (May 1o, 1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1969 (Mar. 18, 1868) (statement of Rep. Fernando Beaman) ("[W]hat
proposition could be more lenient, more indulgent, more merciful to men who have
committed the highest crime known to our laws . . . ."); CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess.
2460 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens) ("My only objection to [Section
31 is that it is too lenient.").
200. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2535 (May 1o, 1866); see also id. at 2463 (May 8, 1866)
(statement of Rep. James A. Garfield) (arguing that permanent disenfranchisement was
more principled and so preferable to the House's proposed disenfranchisement until a fixed
date).
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thundered: "Gentlemen here have said you must not humble these people.
Why not? Do not they deserve humiliation? Do not they deserve degradation?
If they do not, who does? What criminal, what felon deserves it more, sir?"20o
Stevens went on to suggest that if his audience wanted "to forgive and
enfranchise," it would do better to direct its attention toward those convicted
of offenses "such as arson and larceny," who "have not committed half as many
crimes as the rebels." 2o2 For Stevens, disenfranchising Confederates for
rebellion was legitimate a fortiori given the undisputed propriety of
disenfranchising common criminals.
As noted earlier, the radicals' best arguments for mass disenfranchisement
failed in the end, as the Senate rejected the House version of Section 3 and
settled instead on an ostensibly milder version that passed in the House and
now resides in the Fourteenth Amendment: "No person shall . . . hold any
office . . . under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously
taken an oath . . . to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort
to the enemies thereof."2o3
To a great extent, the final version of Section 3 reflected a refinement of the
radicals' philosophy of formal equality. Opposition to the broader House
proposal arose in part from the widespread view that many Confederate
soldiers, even if not conscripted, had little real choice but to join the Southern
cause.2 o4 In that light, the final version of Section 3 was not less punitive so
much as it was more targeted. Whereas the House version promised to affect
the rank and file, the Senate version would reach only the senior leadership.
Moreover, the Senate version was in important ways harsher than the House
version. The House measure would have sunset in 1870 and applied only to
federal elections.2 s By contrast, the final version permanently rendered
201. Id. at 2544 (May 1o, 1866) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens).
202. Id.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
204. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. 2540 (May lo, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Farnsworth) ("Again, some rebels are deserving of a total and lasting disfranchisement,
while others who are embraced in this provision [the House version of Section 3] are not
near so criminal."); Editorial, The Constitutional Amendment in the Senate, supra note 170
("The idea of discriminating in respect of penalties between those who promoted or
voluntarily adhered to the rebellion, and those who became connected with it under a
certain duress, is too evidently reasonable to be easily controverted."). Similar points would
later be repeated during debates over the Reconstruction Acts. See infra note 217.
20S. See FONER, supra note 49, at 259 ("The original provision had applied only to national
elections, leaving the structure of state politics intact .... ); supra note 169 (quoting the




"virtually the entire political leadership of the South ineligible for office," both
state and federal.2' The final version of Section 3 thus reflected a nuanced
view: as compared with felons, Confederate officials were more deserving of
punishment and Southern foot soldiers were less so.
Opposition to the House version was also substantially motivated by
pragmatic considerations.o" For example, the New York Times insisted that
"the expediency or inexpediency of any course looking to reconstruction or
restoration should determine its acceptance or rejection."20s Believing that the
House version of Section 3 would "insure the rejection of the amendment by
the states concerned," the Times praised the Senate's "compromise" approach,
which "the South may be asked to consider with some likelihood of
acceptance."2 '0 The political climate later shifted even further, and Congress
gradually lifted the disqualifications imposed by Section 3. That trend
culminated in the General Amnesty Act, which applied to all state (but not
federal) officers who had engaged in rebellion."o The Act passed in 1872- two
years after the House version of Section 3 would have expired. Like moderates'
hopeful predictions of how the South would respond to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Amnesty Act sprang from a deep desire to return to normalcy
Section 3 would allow rebels to control state legislatures and, thereby, electoral college votes
for President. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2767-68 (May 23, 1866) (statement of
Sen. Jacob Howard). Howard's solution was to disenfranchise all rebels who were twenty-
five years old when the war started, which would "ostracize . . . the really responsible
leaders." Id. at 2768.
206. FONER, supra note 49, at 259 ("[T]he final version of the Amendment, barring from office
Confederates who before the war had taken an oath of allegiance (required of officials
ranging from President down to postmaster), although seemingly more lenient, in some
ways had broader implications.").
207. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2543 (May lo, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Bingham) (raising pragmatic concerns about Section 3, including that it might "furnish
demagogues a pretext for raising the howl" that Republicans were disfranchising rebels
"only that we may control the next presidential election"); id. at 2540 (statement of Rep.
John Farnsworth) ("I cannot regard this section [the House's proposed version of Section 3]
as of any practical value. I believe it to be difficult, if not impossible, of fulfillment; and I
have fears that it may greatly embarrass, if not defeat, the adoption of the other sections
should we pass it through this House."); see also id. at 2461 (May 8, 1866) (statement of
Rep. William Finck) (criticizing the House version as anti-reconciliation and partisan).
208. See Editorial, The Constitutional Amendment in the Senate, supra note 170; see also Editorial,
The Reconstruction Committee's Amendment in the Senate, supra note 170 (arguing that "[t] he
Southern Legislatures would unquestionably refuse to ratify an amendment of which
wholesale disfranchisement is the most prominent feature," thereby dooming the "whole" of
the proposed amendment).
zog. Editorial, The Reconstruction Committee's Amendment in the Senate, supra note 170.
210. General Amnesty Act, ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142 (1872).
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in the postwar period. As should go without saying, formal equality was not
the only value motivating lawmakers during this tumultuous period.
Section 3 calls to mind the Federal Deserter Act"' in that both measures
showcased the punitive as opposed to the egalitarian aspect of radical political
thought. Even as they drew on the philosophy of formal equality to support the
immediate enfranchisement of black Americans, radicals relied on the same
worldview to insist on the "degradation""' of Confederates through their
exclusion from political life. The final version of Section 3 stands as a pointed
reminder of that outlook.
D. The Reconstruction Acts
The Reconstruction era's simultaneous expansion and curtailment of
voting rights was not limited to constitutional lawmaking. After the
Fourteenth Amendment's passage in Congress, almost all the Southern states
initially refused to ratify the measure, largely based on opposition to the still-
punitive final version of Section 3."' Congress needed a new blueprint for
Reconstruction. The solution was the Military Reconstruction Act, enacted
March 2, 1867.214 The Act divided the former Confederacy into military districts
and provided a path for Southern states to return to Congress. Besides
requiring ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act mandated that the
Southern states elect representatives to new state constitutional conventions.
The results were truly historic. For the first time, large numbers of black
Americans voted.
Yet the Act simultaneously extended and circumscribed the franchise. The
crucial provision stated that the constitutions of reconstructed states would be
drafted by delegates
elected by the male citizens of said State, twenty-one years old and
upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who have been
resident in said State for one year previous to the day of such election,
211. Federal Deserter Act, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 487, 490-91 (1865).
212. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2544 (May so, 1866) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus
Stevens).
213. See FONER, supra note 49, at 268 ("Although many objected to the representation clause
[Section 2] as an opening wedge for black suffrage, the section barring from office what one
newspaper called 'the best portion of our citizens' [Section 3] aroused the strongest
opposition.").




except such as may be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion or
for felony at common law."'
Later, on March 23, 1867, Congress passed a supplemental measure that
directed the Union generals governing the former Confederacy to create a
register of eligible voters. The supplemental measure provided that all those
registering to vote must take a series of oaths. One was "that I have not been
disfranchised for participation in any rebellion or civil war against the United
States, nor for felony committed against the laws of any State or of the United
States.",,, 6 Building on Section 3, other oaths required registrants to swear that
they had never occupied a state or federal office before aiding the rebellion."
Because the foregoing statutes contained crime exceptions similar to Section
2's, they show that Congress deliberately preserved disenfranchisement in
Southern constitutional conventions and elections. All this is well known. 18
What is not well known is that these measures were the subject of a heated
and fascinating debate. On January 7, 1867, when the Act was in early stages of
consideration, Stevens proposed an amendment providing "that conviction for
crime except for treason shall not take away the right to vote.""' Realizing that
this proposal had raised eyebrows, Stevens asked the chamber to "indulge" him
215. Id. § 5.
216. Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 5 1, 15 Stat. 2, 2.
217. See id. This provision, like Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, was animated in part by
a sense that not all Confederates were equally culpable. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1211 (Feb. 13, 1867) (statement of Rep. John Bingham) (arguing that widespread
disenfranchisement of those who "aided the rebellion" would be unjust because many did so
only "under an enforced conscription," even though they actually "were friends of the
Constitution"); id. at 815 (Jan. 28, 1867) (statement of Rep. Shelby Cullom) ("I think, sir,
that the leaders of the rebellion should be cut off from participation either in elections or the
right to hold office; but there are too many of those who engaged in the rebellion who did it
because they were carried along by the force of popular excitement, and not from a
disposition to destroy the Union."); the Reconstruction Acts, 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 182, 204-05
(1867) ("A person forced into the rebel service by conscription ... cannot be held to be
disqualified from voting. . . . Forced contributions to the rebel cause . . . do not
disqualify."); The Reconstruction Acts, 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 141, 163 (1867) ("Nor must we
forget that throughout these rebel States there were large classes of their population more or
less opposed to the rebellious movement, and who were yet more or less necessarily
involved in its support."); cf supra note 204 (discussing debates on Section 3).
218. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48-52 (1974).
219. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 324 (Jan. 7, 1867) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus
Stevens). Stevens's proposed language read: "And no person shall be deprived of the right
to vote or otherwise disfranchised by reason of conviction or punishment for any crime
other than for insurrection or treason or misprision of treason." Id.
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so that his audience "may understand." 2 0 "I have received information,"
Stevens explained, "that in North Carolina and other States where punishment
at the whipping-post deprives the person of the right to vote, they are now
every day whipping negroes for a thousand and one trivial offenses." 2 1 Other
radicals had expressed similar concerns during debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 ' Now, based on the chilling revelation from North Carolina,
Stevens argued that criminal disenfranchisement in the South should be
limited to offenses similar to rebellion.2 Stevens believed this measure was
necessary to prevent racists from disenfranchising blacks for petty or newly
invented crimes. Representative Eliot (another radical) later moved to strike
Stevens's proposed language. 2 In Eliot's view, persons convicted of "murder,
robbery, &c" should not vote.s Stevens replied by repeating his own earlier
rationale. Eliot yielded, saying that he would not "press" the issue."
Though no Republican would have condoned the racist disenfranchisement
Stevens described, Congress rejected Stevens's impassioned proposal and instead
preserved criminal disenfranchisement. In a major speech on January 16,
Bingham thoroughly criticized Stevens's draft, reserving his fiercest criticism
for the proposed amendment on disenfranchisement."2 Saying that "a more
monstrous atrocity never was presented in the form of legislation to the
American Congress for its consideration," Bingham quoted and paraphrased
Stevens's disenfranchisement proposal and reminded the House that the Act
would establish conditions for admission into the Union.229 "What is this,"
220. Id.
221. Id.; see also JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, in
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, pt. II, at 35 (1866) (testimony of
Jonathan Roberts, Sheriff, Fairfax County, Virginia on January 31, 1866) ("They are now
passing laws there to disfranchise men who have been voters there. They are passing
vagrant laws on purpose to oppress the colored people . . .
222. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 122-123.
223. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 2d Sess. 324 (Jan. 7, 1867) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus
Stevens).
224. Id. at 8i (Jan. 28, 1867) (statement of Rep. Thomas Eliot).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 815-16 (statement of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens).
227. Id. at 816 (statement of Rep. Thomas Eliot).
228. Id. at 503-04 (Jan. 16, 1867) (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
229. Id.; see also id. app. at 69 (Jan. 21, 1867) (statement of Rep. Elijah Hise) (attacking the
radicals for enfranchising "felons and jail-birds"); id. at 451 (Jan. 14, 1867) (statement of
Rep. John Bingham) (criticizing a draft of the Act, including because states would soon




Bingham continued, "but asking this Congress to say in advance, if the
insurgent States shall so frame their constitutions of State government, that
thieves, robbers, and assassins shall never be deprived of the right of the
elective franchise[,] it will be approved; otherwise their constitutions will be
rejected." 3o Bingham's critique relied not just on formal equality but also on
principles of federalism and prudence. Still, the reaction sparked by Stevens's
failed proposal, as well as other statements of leading radicals,"' leaves little
doubt that at least some Republicans committed to black enfranchisement
sought to preserve criminal disenfranchisement after the Fourteenth
Amendment's passage.
Criminal disenfranchisement again became the topic of debate when the
House considered the conditions under which Southern states might be
readmitted into the Union. On February 13, Bingham proposed a middle road
between unlimited criminal disenfranchisement and Stevens's suggestion of
disenfranchising only traitors -namely, that the Southern states be required to
enfranchise adult men "except such as may be disfranchised by reason of
participation in rebellion or for felony at common law . .. ."3' Echoing other
Republicans opposed to mass disenfranchisement of rebels, 33 Bingham
reminded his audience that the Senate had rejected the House version of
Section 3 and so had decided "against the proposition to disfranchise the whole
body of men who participated in the late rebellion . . . until 1870."23'4 Bingham
concluded with yet another succinct statement of the philosophy of formal
equality, praising "a Government that secures to every human being the equal
protection of its laws; a Government that gives to all citizens who do not forfeit
the privilege by crime, being male persons over twenty-one years resident
therein, equal suffrage." 3 Distinguishing disenfranchisement for rebellion and
for crime, Bingham favored only the latter.
KENDRICK, supra note 1o, at 372 n.3 (calling Stevens's proposal to curb criminal
disenfranchisement "extraordinary").
230. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 504 (Jan. 16, 1867) (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
231. See, e.g., id. app. at 78-80 (Jan. 28, 1867) (statement of Rep. George Washington Julian)
("The citizen's duty of allegiance and the nation's obligation of protection are reciprocal. ...
[T] he citizen's right of representation [may not be deprived] unless he himself forfeits it by
his offenses against society .... ).
232. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1211 (Feb. 13, 1867) (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
233. Others said that mass disenfranchisement itself was inconsistent with rule by "the consent
of the governed," and that Section 3 and the collateral effects of the war had already
"humiliated" former Confederates. See id. at 1564 (Feb. 19, 1867) (statement of Sen. John
Sherman).
234. Id. at 1212 (Feb. 13, 1867) (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
235. Id.
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As ultimately enacted on March 2 over President Johnson's veto,"' the
Military Reconstruction Act adopted Bingham's proposed language and so
implemented a kind of compromise. Whereas Section 2'S "other crime" phrase
exempted all criminal disenfranchisement from the apportionment penalty and
Stevens's proposal would have prohibited criminal disenfranchisement only for
treason, the Act and its supplemental legislation took a middle path, permitting
disenfranchisement only for conviction of a "felony at common law"37 or
simply a "felony.""' The resulting state conventions likewise produced new
constitutions with race-neutral suffrage and felon disenfranchisement."3
Congress later admitted these states while imposing a "fundamental condition"
that they never constrict their franchises for reasons other than "felonies at
common law."" 0 For the first time, broad felon disenfranchisement laws
became the nationwide norm, including in the South."
The Reconstruction Act's relatively narrow references to "felony"
disenfranchisement addressed Stevens's concern that the former slaves were
being unjustly disenfranchised for "a thousand and one trivial offenses."" As
Bingham put it, "The governments of the rebel states cannot make a man a
236. For an account of the bill's turbulent progress, see BENEDICT, supra note 52, at 216-43.
237. An Act To Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States (Military
Reconstruction Act), ch. 153, 5 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867).
238. Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, S 1, 15 Stat. 2, 2 (amending the Military Reconstruction Act).
239. For example, Louisiana disenfranchised those guilty of "treason, perjury, forgery, bribery, or
other crime punishable in the penitentiary. . . ." LA. CONST. of 1868 art. 99 (adopted Mar. 8,
1868); see generally KEYSSAR, supra note 44, app. tbl. A.15 (compiling the era's
disenfranchisement laws).
240. The states' constitutions were never to "be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen
or class of citizens of the United States of the right to vote in said State, who are entitled to
vote by the constitution thereof herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes
as are now felonies at common law." An Act To Admit the States of North Carolina, South
Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, to Representation in Congress, ch. 70,
15 Stat. 73 (1868); see also An Act To Admit the State of Arkansas to Representation in
Congress, ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72 (1868); An Act To Admit the State of Virginia to
Representation in the Congress of the United States, ch. 1o, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (1870); An Act
To Admit the State of Mississippi to Representation in the Congress of the United States,
ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (1870). These requirements were widely viewed as legally
unenforceable. See KLARMAN, supra note 44, at 29 & n.68.
241. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 44, at 49 fig- 2.1.
242. See supra text accompanying note 221. Imitating Section 2, the Act evolved from a simple
negative prohibition to an affirmative one with a rebellion exception, and finally gained a
crime exception as well. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1176-77, 1182, 1211-14 (Feb.
12-13, 1867) (discussing the "Blaine Amendment"). The proper approach and exceptions
continued to be a subject of debate. See, e.g., id. at 1384 (Feb. 15, 1867) (statement of Sen.




felon by statute who is not such at common law."" In other words, the
Republicans realized - as later events would bear out' - that it was easier both
to invent and to prosecute trumped-up misdemeanor offenses like vagrancy, as
compared with more serious and well-recognized common law crimes, such as
murder' 5 Congress's views on criminal disenfranchisement thus appear to
have changed after the passage of Section 2. Whereas broad criminal
disenfranchisement powers may have seemed conducive to racial equality when
wielded by the federal government, it later became apparent that placing those
same powers in the hands of Southern states posed a major threat to racial
justice. The Republicans came to realize that their commitment to formal
equality pulled in divergent directions.
Bingham's role in drafting the Act exemplifies the irony of egalitarian
disenfranchisement. He insisted on the legitimacy of felon disenfranchisement
in the South, even after hearing Stevens's contrary arguments. 46 Yet he also
championed race-blind voting rights in elections to select representatives to the
new state constitutional conventions. His statutory amendment -which, again,
was ultimately included as a cornerstone of the Act-addressed both points.
Bingham explained the connection in a compact passage. The "emancipated
slaves" were finally to be "righteously clothed with the highest rights of citizens
of the Republic."" 7 This outcome was the product of republican governance
and its requirement that "every man, being a citizen of the United States, shall
have equal rights and full and equal protection until he forfeits it by crime
. . .. 4 Once again, black enfranchisement and criminal disenfranchisement
advanced together in the Reconstruction era.
243. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1328 (Feb. 18, 1867) (statement of Rep. John Bingham);
see also id. ("Mr. Bingham: Does the gentleman say he objects to the disfranchisement of any
man after conviction of felony at common law? Mr. Banks: I do not object. . . .").
244. See Shapiro, supra note 23, at 542 n.26 (explaining that Southern states' selection of
disenfranchisement crimes, including what would have been petty offenses in Northern
states, was designed to facilitate easy convictions of blacks (citing JOHN L. LOVE, THE
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE NEGRO 16 (1899); and John C. Rose, Negro Suffrage: The
Constitutional Point of View, 1 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 17, 25-27 (1906))).
245. See Ewald, supra note 73, at 1094-95 (discussing Ratliffv. Beale, 20 So. 865, 867-68 (Miss.
1896)).
246. See supra text accompanying note 228-230.
247. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 1211 (Feb. 13, 1867) (statement of Rep. John Bingham).
248. Id.
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E. The Fifteenth Amendment
In 1868, Republican presidential candidate Ulysses S. Grant won a
resounding victory in the Electoral College. Yet Grant bested his rival by only
300,000 popular votes-fewer than the 450,000 Southern blacks who
overwhelmingly voted Republican." The returns provided an arresting
glimpse into the potential power of black voters, including in the North.5 0
What had so recently seemed impossible suddenly became a partisan necessity:
black Americans had to be provided a constitutional right to vote.2 s' Criminal
disenfranchisement played a central role in the ensuing debates. In short,
radical Republicans argued that the former slaves should be included in the
body politic for the same reason that criminals were to be excluded from it.
With a few notable exceptions,2 s2 Republicans offered Congress two
approaches to what would become the Fifteenth Amendment: an affirmative
approach and a negative approach.' Under the affirmative approach, many
249. GILLETTE, supra note 88, at 40.
250. Id. at 80 ("Democrats and Republicans alike clearly recognized the strategic importance of
the northern Negro vote.").
251. See id.
252. Some marginal proposals mandated formal parity in the franchise. See CONG. GLOBE, 4oth
Cong., 3d Sess. 1308 (Feb. 17, 1869) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (proposing that
citizens "of African descent shall have the same right to vote and hold office in States and
Territories as other citizens"); id. at 1306 (statement of Sen. Joseph Fowler) (proposing
forbidding "the right of citizens of the United States to vote and hold office" from being
abridged or denied); id. at 708 (Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Sen. Samuel Pomeroy read by
Sen. Benjamin Wade) (proposing forbidding disenfranchisement "for any reasons not
equally applicable to all citizens"); see also id. at 1305 (Feb. 17, 1869) (statement of Sen.
James Doolittle) (proposing adding "[n]or shall any citizen be so denied, by reason of any
alleged crime, unless duly convicted thereof by the verdict of an impartial jury" to the
eventually adopted text of the Fifteenth Amendment).
253. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 863 (Feb. 4, 1869) (statement of Sen. Oliver
Morton) ("I would prefer an affirmative amendment, an amendment declaring who shall
have the right to vote, not a negation but an affirmation .... ); id. app. at 97 (Jan. 29, 1869)
(statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger). Professor William Gillette recognized a difference
between "affirmative" and "negative" drafts, but viewed some drafts as "essentially"
negative simply because they included negative terms (e.g., "shall not"), even if their overall
effect was to establish a general right to vote (e.g., "states shall not violate the right to
vote"). See GILLETTE, supra note 88, at 53-58. Consistent with Gillette's categorization,
Reconstruction figures did sometimes call drafts more or less "negative" based on the mere
presence of negative language; but when they did so, they also took pains to emphasize the
"essential" and, from a legal point of view, far more meaningful distinction between drafts
that banned specific voting qualifications (what the main text calls negative) and drafts that
banned all voting qualifications, subject to exceptions (affirmative). CONG. GLOBE 4oth




Republicans (including Bingham) 1 4 wanted the Fifteenth Amendment to
establish a relatively comprehensive federal right to vote, subject to a limited
set of delineated voting qualifications.' This affirmative approach would
protect against property, literacy, nativity, and religious qualifications, as well
as grandfather clauses and other voting qualifications not yet imagined."' Like
any other form of restriction on the affirmatively described right to vote,
criminal disenfranchisement would survive only if it received an express
exemption. By contrast, the "negative" approach would prohibit only
specifically repudiated qualifications, such as race. 57 While it could have
sweeping implications if a wide range of prohibited qualifications were listed,
as some radicals proposed,"' the negative approach would preserve the states'
254. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 728 (Jan. 29, 1869) (affirmative structure); id. at 638
(Jan. 27, 1869) (same). Bingham and Boutwell also sometimes proposed negative
formulations, including ones with lengthy lists of prohibited qualifications. Id. at 1425-27
(Feb. 2o, 1869) (proposals ranging from a simple negative formulation prohibiting racial
disenfranchisement to a negative formulation prohibiting disenfranchisement for "race,
color, nativity, property, creed, or previous condition of servitude"); see id. at 694 (Jan. 28,
1869) (statement of Rep. Samuel McKee) ("infamous crimes" exception).
255. See, e.g., id. at 728 (Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger) ("No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall deny or abridge to any male citizen of the United States
of the age of twenty-one years or over, and who is of sound mind, an equal vote at all
elections in the State in which he shall have his actual residence, such right to vote to be
under such regulations as shall be prescribed by law, except to such as have engaged, or may
hereafter engage, in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, and to such as shall be
duly convicted of infamous crime." (emphases added)); id. (statement of Rep. John Bingham)
("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge or deny to any male citizen of
the United States of sound mind and twenty-one years of age or upward the equal exercise,
subject to such registration laws as the State may establish, of the elective franchise at all
elections in the State wherein he shall have actually resided for a period of one year next
preceding such election, except such of said citizens as shall engage in rebellion or
insurrection, or who may have been, or shall be, duly convicted of treason or other infamous
crime." (emphases added)).
256. For Republicans expressing these concerns, see supra note 122.
257. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3 d Sess. 542 (Jan. 23, 1869) (Senate Judiciary
Committee proposal); id. at 378-79 (Jan. 15, 1869) (statement of Sen. William Stewart)
("Stewart Proposal"). See generally GILLETTE, supra note 88, at 55-57 (summarizing
differences between the two approaches). Sumner proposed a substitute version that,
among other things, forbade disenfranchisement "under any pretense of race or color."
CONG. GLOBE, 4 oth Cong., 3 d Sess. 1041 (Feb. 9, 1869).
258. See supra note 254; see also CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3 d Sess. 1oo9 (Feb. 8, 1869)
(statement of Sen. Henry Wilson) ("race, color, nativity, property, education, or religious
belief').
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traditional default control over suffrage qualifications.' 9 In other words, the
negative approach would leave intact any voting qualification not expressly
mentioned. No special exemption would be necessary.
Radicals advocating the affirmative approach consistently specified that any
new federal right to vote would not extend to serious criminals. For example,
on January 29, 1869, Shellabarger proposed language permitting
disenfranchisement for those "duly convicted of treason, felony, or other
infamous crime."12 6 o Bingham proposed substantially identical language,26' as
well as language permitting disenfranchisement for "treason or other crime of
the grade of felony at common law." 26 , In the Senate, Warner likewise
proposed language that protected state disenfranchisement laws for those
convicted of "treason, felony, or other infamous crime",,6' and for "treason or
other crime of the grade of felony at common law. 11264
These drafts demonstrate that even the strongest proponents of broad
enfranchisement took care to ensure that the Fifteenth Amendment would
leave room for criminal disenfranchisement. All sides in the debates leading up
to the Fifteenth Amendment understood that felon disenfranchisement would
259. The Fifteenth Amendment's opponents gave many speeches invoking federalism principles.
See, e.g., id. at 708 (Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Sen. James Dixon).
26o. Shellabarger's exceptions clause at that time read in its entirety: "[E]xcept to such as have
engaged or may hereafter engage in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, and
to such as shall be duly convicted of treason, felony, or other infamous crime." Id. app. at 97
(Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger). Shellabarger explained that the
point of his draft was to cabin Southern discretion to use literacy, intelligence, or property
tests to perpetuate black disenfranchisement. Id. Others proposed substantially identical
language. See id. at 728 (Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Rep. John Bingham); see also id. at 1426
(Feb. 20, 1869) (statement of Rep. George Boutwell) (proposing "infamous crime"
language); id. at 1029 (Feb. 9, 1869) (statement of Sen. Frederick Sawyer) (same). After
Boutwell proposed a prohibition on education and property qualifications, Bingham argued
that those prohibitions would imply that other forms of voting qualifications, such as
religious qualifications, were permissible. See id. at 726-28 (Jan. 29, 1869). Bingham's fear of
inferences from negative implication resembled Sumner's. See supra notes 1o8-lo9 and
accompanying text.
261. See supra note 255.
262. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 638 (Jan. 27, 1869).
263. Id. at 861 (Feb. 4, 1869) (statement of Sen. Willard Warner); see also id. at 1041 (Feb. 9, 1869)
(statement of Sen. Willard Warner) (proposing a draft whereby every "male citizen" would
have an equal right to vote unless disenfranchised for "treason or other crime of the grade of
felony at common law"). Warner argued in favor of the affirmative approach, pointing out
that "nine tenths of [Southern blacks] might be prevented from voting and holding office
by the requirement on the part of the States or of the United States of an intelligence or
property qualification." Id. at 862 (Feb. 4,1869) (statement of Sen. Willard Warner).




be protected- either explicitly, by including express exemptions (the
affirmative approach), or implicitly, by leaving intact the states' broad default
authority over suffrage (the negative approach).
To be sure, the competing drafts would have permitted criminal
disenfranchisement to varying degrees. Most affirmative formulations would
have confined disenfranchisement to certain types of crime, such as felonies at
common law or "infamous" crimes. These proposals would have forbidden
disenfranchisement for most or all misdemeanors. In contrast, the negative
versions typically omitted any mention of criminal disenfranchisement and so
did not prohibit it. The more confining affirmative drafts, like similar drafts of
Section 2 and the Reconstruction Acts, may have sprung from a fear that
Southerners were using disenfranchisement for petty offenses to oppress black
voters. These drafts also reflected a belief that the right to vote can be forfeited
only through serious crime.
In the end, the Fifteenth Amendment adopted the negative approach
without mentioning criminal disenfranchisement: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."126s
Though this provision was negatively structured, whereas Section 2 was
affirmatively structured, both provisions exhibited a broadly permissive
attitude toward criminal disenfranchisement.66 Moreover, the Fifteenth
Amendment's drafting process resembles that of Section 2. As proposed by the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction and introduced in January of 1866, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Section 2 would have provided: "That whenever
the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race
or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of
representation.",267 This proposed language closely parallels the final version of
the Fifteenth Amendment. Both the draft version of Section 2 and the final
version of the Fifteenth Amendment exhibited a negative structure in that they
prohibited a specified voting qualification. By contrast, the final version of
Section 2 and the radical drafts of the Fifteenth Amendment both displayed an
affirmative structure in that they established broad protections for voting
265. U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1.
266. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 863 (Feb. 4, 1869) (statement of Sen. Oliver
Morton) (comparing the affirmative and negative approaches and ruefully explaining that
the negative approach preserves states' authority to disenfranchise "for other reasons save
and except those mentioned" in the Amendment); GILLETTE, supra note 88, at 71 (asserting
that the Fifteenth Amendment was "a moderate one in that its wording was negative").
267. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 351 (Jan. 22, 1866).
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rights-subject only to limited exceptions, including for criminal
disenfranchisement.
Criminal disenfranchisement was also frequently discussed during the
debates on the Fifteenth Amendment. Consider the remarks of Ohio
Representative James Ashley in December 1867, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was nearing ratification and consideration of what would become
the Fifteenth Amendment was still in its nascent stages. In a party known for
its radicals, few could match Ashley in prominence and fervor. He had
submitted the first draft of the Thirteenth Amendment,6' and had been one of
the earliest and most zealous advocates of impeaching President Johnson."'
True to form, in 1867, Ashley proposed an amendment extending the franchise
to all residents, including women; repealing Section 2's apportionment
penalty, which he ridiculed as a coward's half-measure; and creating a
constitutional right to public education.2 70 Yet Ashley's proposed amendment
made no bones about the propriety of disenfranchising common law felons.
"Each state," Ashley's proposal read, "may disenfranchise any person for
participation in rebellion against the United States, or for the commission of an
act which is felony at common law."2 7 1
Ashley drew on John Stuart Mill's 1861 Considerations on Representative
Government, which argued that the elective franchise is best viewed not as an
individual right but rather as a moral "trust" shared by all citizens. 72 Ashley
explained that he "would withhold the ballot from no citizen of mature years,
black or white, native or foreign born, without good cause" and that he would
"plead for the equal rights of all before the law."2 73 Explicitly borrowing from
Mill's writings in support of criminal disenfranchisement, Ashley made clear
that he too "would not secure the ballot to barbarians, to uncivilized Indians or
Indians while in the tribal relation, nor to persons non compos, but to all citizens
'not disqualified,' as John St[u]art Mill expresses it, 'by their own default.' 274
268. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., ist Sess. 19 (Dec. 16, 1863).
269. See generally ROBERT F. HOROWITZ, THE GREAT IMPEACHER: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF
JAMES M. ASHLEY (1979).
270. CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong. 2d Sess. 117 (Dec. to, 1867).
271. Id.
272. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (London, Parker,
Son & Brown 1861). Henry Adams later concluded that the Fifteenth Amendment had
implicitly denied "the dogma that suffrage is a natural right, and not a trust" in part because
"[e]ducation and even property qualifications are not excluded" by it. See GILLETTE, supra
note 88, at 76.
273. CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (Dec. lo, 1867) (statement of Rep. James Ashley).




Ashley elaborated on this broad but pointedly limited conception of the
franchise:
[I]t is remembered that citizenship, as we of the Republican party
contend, makes the person on whom it is conferred a member of this
great nation, that the privilege of franchise, which we contend ought
also to be conferred and guaranteed with citizenship, constitutes him
the equal of the native born citizen . . . [and] that with this citizenship,
he has rights and duties, privileges and immunities, which cannot be
taken away "except by his own default . . . . 7
This is an eloquent statement of the logic of formal equality. In "this great
nation," the newly naturalized citizen is "equal to the native born" because both
are equal citizens before the law. But a criminal's own "default" sets him apart
in the eyes of the law. Ashley makes this point repeatedly, noting at one
juncture, "Of course I refer to citizens who are guiltless of crime . ... 276
Exhibiting the irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement, Ashley espoused a
philosophy of both exaltation and degradation. While arguing fervently against
limitations on the right to vote based on race, property, and education, Ashley
repeatedly, sometimes in the very same breath, 77 endorsed criminal
disenfranchisement."' Far from committing any wrong, Ashley explained, the
former slaves had volunteered in large numbers to fight for the Union in the
Civil War. 7 9 In contrast, felons declared themselves enemies of the lawful
political order and so replicated in miniature the Confederacy's rebellion
against legitimate government.
Ashley was hardly alone in combining a radically expansive conception of
the elective franchise with a commitment to criminal disenfranchisement.
Similar or identical views were expounded by many radical Republicans during
the weeks leading up to the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment on February
26, 1869.
On January 27, 1869, Illinois Representative Shelby Cullom blessed
criminal disenfranchisement even as he bemoaned Section 2 for impliedly
275. Id.
276. Id. at 117.
277. For example, Ashley argued for a right to vote "which would exclude no one of any race or
nationality except for the commission of crime." Id. at 118.
278. Id. at 119.
279. Id. ("Sir, if, after all the loyal white and black men of the South have done for this nation
during the late rebellion, the Republican party should now abandon them, I must abandon
it.").
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condoning racial disenfranchisement. Cullom said bluntly, "A State has the
right to disfranchise its felons, but it has no right to disfranchise its citizens on
account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery."2so Government rules
with "the consent of the governed," Cullom explained, and so "[h]e who is
subject to law, helps to uphold it, and performs all the duties of a citizen, shall
have the right to vote in its affairs." "" Those properly enfranchised included
"the rich," "the poor," "the uneducated" -indeed, "all classes in the State of
sound mind and not felons."
On January 28, 1869, South Carolina Representative Manuel Corley
explained that any republic must be ruled with the "consent of the
governed.",,' He therefore concluded that no citizen, including women, should
be excluded from the body politic - "except for rebellion or crime," in which
case the individual has broken the social compact. 8 4 Corley's language
borrowed from Section 2's "crime" exception and so indicated that Section 2'S
endorsement of criminal disenfranchisement would survive the Fifteenth
Amendment.
On January 29, 1869, Senator Samuel Pomeroy of Kansas argued that "the
strength of the Republican party consists in its adherence to principle" -
namely, the principle of "equality of rights among men."121s Pomeroy
condemned the "monstrous inconsistency" 86 of slavery, argued from the
"consent of the governed," extolled women's enfranchisement, and invoked
John Stuart Mill."' Yet for all his fervor, Pomeroy supported only the
enfranchisement of those who "discharge[] faithfully the duties of a citizen"
and opposed only the disenfranchisement of "any innocent citizen."12SS
280. CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d Sess. 651 (Jan. 27, 1869) (statement of Rep. Shelby Cullom).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. app. at 94 (Jan. 28, 1869) (statement of Rep. Manuel Corley).
284. Id. Corley endorsed women's enfranchisement, saying, for example, "We wish to make her
legally responsible for treason, as she is for other crimes." Id.
28S. Id. at 708 (Jan. 29,1869) (statement of Sen. Samuel Pomeroy).
286. Id. at 709.
287. Id. at 710.
288. Id. at 709-10; see also id. at 906 (Feb. 5, 1869) (statement of Sen. Samuel Pomeroy) (stating,
while discussing the disenfranchisement of Southerners, "I am for extending suffrage to all
persons not convicted of crime, and I want it placed in the Constitution"); CONG. GLOBE,
3 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (Dec. 10, 1866) (statement of Sen. Samuel Pomeroy) ("I shall vote
to give the ballot to every man of the prescribed age and of the proper residence who has not




Also on January 29, Republican Representative Christopher Bowen of
South Carolina drew on formal equality in order to oppose not just racial but
also class-based constraints on suffrage:
Sir, in my opinion, in this age of progress, the time has now come that
the Constitution of these United States should be so amended as to give
to every citizen . .. whether white or black, that right sacred and dear to
every American citizen-the right of suffrage. Sir, is poverty or color a
crime, that it should deprive an American citizen of this boon?9
To answer Bowen's rhetorical question, neither "poverty" nor "color" was
viewed as a "crime" meriting disenfranchisement. Rather, they were deemed
conditions or statuses - and illegitimate qualifications for the elective franchise.
On January 30, 1869, Representative John Broomall of Pennsylvania'o
explained that everyone should have "an equal voice in making and
administering the laws, unless debarred for violating those laws; and in this I
make no distinction of wealth, intelligence, race, family, or sex." 91 Broomall
accordingly supported an "amendment to the Constitution securing to all
citizens of full age, without regard to sex, an equal voice in making and
administering the laws under which they live, to be forfeited only for crime." 292
At that time, a "just nation, founded upon the full and free consent of the
1,293
citizens, will be no longer a dream ....
On February 4, Alabama Senator Willard Warner defended an affirmatively
structured draft amendment on the ground that it would eliminate
"aristocracies" of "birth," "wealth," and "learning." 9 4 He explained that
American government is based "on the idea that the right of self-government is
inherent in manhood," and that "each individual" deserved "an equal share of
political power." 295 Warner concluded, "I am in favor of giving equally to all
citizens of the Republic of sound mind and unstained by great crimes the right
289. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 96 (Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Rep.
Christopher Bowen).
290. In 1866, Broomall had significantly participated in the debates over Section 2. See, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1262-65 (Mar. 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Broomall).
291. CONG. GLOBE, 4 oth Cong., 3 d Sess. app. at 102 (Jan. 30, 1869) (statement of Rep. John
Broomall).
292. Id. app. at 103.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 861 (Feb. 4, 1869) (statement of Sen. Willard Warner).
29s. Id.
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to vote and hold office.",,, 6 Warner's primary regret was that his era was not
yet ready for women's enfranchisement. 7
On February 8, Ohio Senator John Sherman outlined five widely employed
but, in his view, inappropriate "causes of exclusion" from the franchise-
namely, race, property, religion, nativity, and education. 98 Sherman argued at
length that "it would be wiser and better to declare that every male citizen of
the United States, native or naturalized, above the age of twenty one years,
shall have the right to vote, unless he is excluded for crime . . . .""' Sherman
underscored his exception, noting that disenfranchisement is inappropriate
"unless where the right has been forfeited by crime."3 oo
Steeped in the philosophy of formal equality, these radical legislators
viewed race (and often class, nativity, and sex) as mere statuses unlike morally
culpable crimes meriting disenfranchisement. Radicals accordingly justified
criminal disenfranchisement even while advocating major suffrage reforms,
some of which would become law only many decades later. Their repeated
statements are especially noteworthy because no proposal up for debate would
have eliminated criminal disenfranchisement. Rather, the radicals discussed
criminal disenfranchisement to explain and defend their affirmative conception
of what it meant to have constitutional equality in the electoral franchise.
Conservative legislators were indifferent to formal equality and tended to
oppose all federal regulation of the franchise as unwarranted intrusions into
state sovereignty. For them, criminal disenfranchisement was not in a special
moral category so much as it was another example of legitimate state
prerogatives. To the limited extent that Democrats and conservative
Republicans did single out criminal disenfranchisement, they, too, viewed it as
a paradigm of legitimacy. 01 Consider Senator Doolittle's unique hybrid draft
combining a narrow prohibition on racial discrimination with an apparently
296. Id. at 862. Warner was alert to the practical dangers of allowing criminal disenfranchisement.
Id. (explaining that the power to disenfranchise "may be used to build up an aristocracy,"
whereas "[t]o give to States the power to disfranchise and disqualify for crime is a very
limited and possibly not dangerous concession").
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1013 (Feb. 8, 1869) (statement of Sen. John Sherman).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See, e.g., id. at 1305 (Feb. 17, 1869) (statement of Sen. James Doolittle) (opposing the





redundant exemption for criminal disenfranchisement.3 o2 Doolittle had allied
with President Johnson, opposed the Reconstruction Amendments, and often
made openly racist statements on the floor.3 o3 Why was Doolittle proposing
drafts of the Fifteenth Amendment? Fearful of racist disenfranchisement,
Republicans had proposed that disenfranchisement be confined to persons
convicted of some crime.304 Doolittle co-opted this idea. By proposing that
disenfranchisement be limited to those "duly convicted" of "crime," Doolittle's
proposal purported to invalidate the federally mandated "loyalty oaths" that
disenfranchised many Confederates, even if they had not been convicted of any
crime.3o' In other words, Doolittle hoped to highlight a tension between the
radicals' solicitude for former slaves and their eagerness to punish rebels.
To be sure, some prominent figures supported substantial voting reform
yet balked at the full implications of the philosophy of formal equality.o' The
most well-known example is Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who cast the Fifteenth
Amendment in a decidedly negative light while arguing for women's
enfranchisement. Stanton asserted that "American women of wealth,
education, virtue and refinement" should oppose the Fifteenth Amendment
until they, too, might be enfranchised, lest "the lower orders of Chinese,
Mricans, Germans and Irish, with their low ideas of womanhood . . . make
laws for you and your daughters.""o' Having abandoned the reasoning of
formal equality, Stanton's remarks reflected an understanding of virtue and
vice driven by racist and other status-based prejudices. But Stanton's
arguments were also designed to take advantage of widespread Republican
302. See id. ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote and hold office shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude; nor shall any citizen be so denied, by reason of any alleged crime,
unless duly convicted thereof by the verdict of an impartial jury."). After Sen. Doolittle
proposed this language, Senator Charles Buckalew asked if Doolittle would modify the last
part of the sentence to read "duly convicted thereof according to law," and Doolittle agreed.
Id.
303. See, e.g., id. at lolo (Feb. 8, 1869) (statement of Sen. James Doolittle) (arguing against black
enfranchisement based on a racial supremacy theory); id. app. at 151.
304. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
305. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1305 (Feb. 17, 1869) (statement of Sen. James
Doolittle).
306. See, e.g., id. at gol (Feb. 5, 1869) (statement of Sen. George Williams) (condemning the
"political filth and moral pollution" of Asian immigrant voters); id. at 862 (Feb. 4, 1869)
(statement of Sen. Willard Warner).
307. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Sixteenth Amendment, REVOLUTION, Apr. 29, 1869, at 3; see also
DuBois, supra note 166, at 178-79.
1639
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
support for literacy and education qualifications, which, for many, seemed
consistent with formal equality's prioritization of act over status.3o'
Republican views on literacy and educational tests were captured in an
important paper by Charles Francis Adams, Jr. The piece assumed the
contractarian premise that "the existence of caste is manifestly inconsistent
with any theory of human equality" as well as with "the consent of the
governed."3 o' Adams then accepted (albeit somewhat ruefully) that it was both
inevitable and right that the franchise be extended without regard to race, sex,
nativity, and property. Yet Adams bemoaned the Fifteenth Amendment and
fretted that "Universal Suffrage can only mean in plain English the
government of ignorance and vice."3"o Adams's solution was to insist on
literacy and other educational qualifications.' In the view of many
Republicans, these so-called intelligence tests resembled criminal laws in that
they rewarded achievement while punishing bad conduct. Adams accordingly
extolled "the ideal Government founded on the popular consent" where "[n]o
barrier to a purified suffrage will be recognized which cannot be surmounted
by the moderate efforts of average humanity" and where "the highest privilege
of the citizen, at once a right and a reward, will be given or refused on
principles of even justice."3" This argument echoes Sumner's vision of an
"accessible" franchise without "insurmountable" barriers.1
Of course, formal equality was not the only guiding principle in the
Reconstruction Congress. Consider California Congressman William Higby's
statement on March 3 that "[i]n the fourteenth article we deny to the common
felon and the traitor the right to vote.""' Insisting that blacks should not be
grouped "on the side with the felons and traitors," Higby asked, "[w]hy do we
308. See KEYssAR, supra note 44, at 78-79; see also, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-99
(Dec. 13, 1866) (statement of Sen. Lafayette Foster) (supporting both women's
enfranchisement and literacy tests). But see CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 94
(Jan. 28, 1869) (statement of Rep. Manuel Corley); CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 2d Sess.
350-51 (Jan. 8, 1867) (statement of Rep. John Broomall) (opposing literacy tests and
pointing out that illiteracy among Southern blacks was largely due to Southern laws
criminalizing the education of blacks).
309. See Charles Francis Adams, Jr., The Protection of the Ballot in National Elections, 1 J. Soc. SCI.
91, 104-05 (1869).
310. Id. at lo8.
311. Id. at 111 ("Our efforts should be devoted to the practical development of these two
principles of intelligence and impartiality in the suffrage . . .
312. Id.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 110-118.




deny the right to these classes?""' The answer: "In part as a penalty and in part
to disarm dangerous men of power." ,, 6 Higby's express endorsement of "felon"
disenfranchisement as a legitimate "penalty" is best understood as an
expression of formal equality; yet, Higby also adverted to "traitors" and the
practical need to disempower "dangerous" Confederates. Plainly, Higby's
views on criminal disenfranchisement, like those of his contemporaries and of
Americans today, cannot be reduced to any simple formula. Manifold
considerations of justice, law, and politics influenced all the tumultuous events
of Reconstruction, including Republican voting reforms.
The philosophy of formal equality nonetheless played a key role in the
making of the Reconstruction Amendments and had special force for the most
radical members of Congress. Criminal disenfranchisement was the logical
consequence of the new equality of suffrage envisioned by Congress's most
radical progressives. The debates that gave rise to the Fifteenth Amendment
accordingly included not just public justifications for racial enfranchisement,
but also widely accepted reasons for criminal disenfranchisement.
II. THE LAW OF CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
The irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement sheds light on significant and
ongoing legal debates. While the analysis that follows is based in large part on
history, it is not just for originalists: today, even nonoriginalists agree that
history is important to constitutional interpretation. 17 At least since the
Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Richardson v. Ramirez,' historical
arguments have played a central role in the law of criminal disenfranchisement.
This Part draws on the historical link between voting and vice to explore four
clusters of arguments discussed in scholarship and case law. The result is a new
and stronger justification for criminal disenfranchisement's lawfulness - at
least in connection with serious crimes.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636-37 (20o8) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) (discussing an emerging consensus
that originalism is integral to constitutional interpretation); James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to
the Constitution: The Promise ofNew Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011) (same).
318. 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
1641
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
A. Originalism and the "Affirmative Sanction"
Richardson v. Ramirez is the foundational Supreme Court precedent
upholding the constitutionality of criminal disenfranchisement. The case
involved a California statute that disenfranchised those who had committed
"infamous crimes." A class of convicted felons sued the State, claiming that the
statute violated their fundamental right to vote as protected by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In response, the Court noted
that Section 2 exempted from its apportionment penalty disenfranchisement
for "crime.""' The Court then reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause
contained in Section i "could not have been meant to bar outright a form of
disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic
sanction of reduced representation" provided for in Section 2.32o The crime
exception accordingly constituted an "affirmative sanction" for felon
disenfranchisement, immunizing the practice from constitutional challenges
based on the fundamental right to vote. After canvassing a range of additional
historical sources, the Court concluded, "We hold that the understanding of
those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is of controlling
significance.""' Just over a decade later in Hunter v. Underwood, the Court used
even stronger language in referring to the "implicit authorization of § 2 to deny
the vote to citizens 'for participation in rebellion, or other crime.' 3 2 2
Ramirez has been criticized for relying on constitutional text alone to
establish that there is something "affirmative" about Section 2's "other crime"
exception. As a number of Second Circuit judges explained, "Declining to
prohibit something is not the same as protecting it.""' And Section 2 is not
even a prohibition; instead, it provides that disenfranchising states may suffer
a loss of representation in Congress. As a logical matter, Congress could have
created exceptions to that specialized penalty without endorsing anything.
Whether a particular exception represents an endorsement depends on the
exception's meaning in light of its legal and social context. By analogy, a statute
might require that "drug offenders, except for repeat offenders, shall
participate in community service programs." The exception in that
hypothesized statute-"except for repeat offenders" -would not show that
319. Id. at 41-55.
320. Id. at 55.
321. Id. at 54.
322. 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (citing Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24).




repeat offenders were endorsed, tolerated, or even viewed as the lesser evil. 3* It
certainly would not imply that repeat offenders should be immunized from the
more drastic penalty of incarceration. Instead, the exception would reflect a
narrow judgment as to a particular remedy. Repeat offenders could have been
exempted because they were thought to be incorrigible, because scarce
resources might be better spent in other ways, or because of an arbitrary
compromise.
On its face, the Fourteenth Amendment does not disclose the basis for
criminal disenfranchisement's special exemption from the Section 2
apportionment penalty. As David L. Shapiro observed, "there is not a word in
the fourteenth amendment suggesting that the exemptions in section two's
formula are in any way a barrier to the judicial application of section one in
voting rights cases . . . ."" Moreover, Ramirez "refers to no legislative history
of the amendment suggesting such a barrier." 12 6 The Ramirez dissenters agreed
with that assessment." So did John Hart Ely. "All Section 2 tells us," Ely
explained, "is that a state can deny felons the vote without opening itself to a
congressional reduction of its representation in Congress.""' Some critics have
gone even further, asserting that the "other crime" exception lacked any
principled justification at all. For example, George Fletcher has suggested that
the exception was included as a mere "afterthought.""' The Ramirez dissenters
likewise thought it of "dispositive" significance that Section 2 was the
unprincipled product of "political exigency"330 - an assessment that finds ample
324. Similar arguments were made to show that the negative version of Section 2 did not endorse
racial discrimination. See Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at 59-60.
325. David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REV. 293, 303
(1976). Shapiro also suggested that the crime exception applies only when the right to vote
is "abridged," not "denied." Id. at 303 n.34, 305. This idea is as hard to square with Section
2's text as it is with its history. Cf Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at 81-85 (explaining that
abridgement originally occurred when a voter was excluded from just a subset of the
covered elections, as opposed to all of them).
326. Shapiro, supra note 325, at 304.
327. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 75 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the mere fact that "Congress
chose to exempt one form of electoral discrimination from the reduction-of-representation
remedy provided by § 2 does not necessarily imply congressional approval" of that
discrimination); see also Fletcher, Disenfranchisement, supra note 32, at 1903.
328. Ely, supra note 45, at 1195; see also FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at
149; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw S 13-16, at 1094 (2d ed. 1988).
329. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 149.
33o. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 73-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at
43-44).
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scholarly support.33' Even the Ramirez majority assumed that Section 2 was an
"accident" of history with no deeper purpose. Yet the Court had to rely on an
inferred endorsement-what it called an "affirmative sanction"-in order to
explain why Section 2 could limit the meaning of Section I.m' In taking that
inferential step, Ramirez introduced the possibility that the affirmative sanction
could be refuted (or narrowed) by historical evidence. If the crime exception
were unprincipled or even inadvertent, as critics have argued, then Section 2
might not illuminate the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause or the
fundamental right to vote.
But Ramirez's "affirmative sanction" holding is more defensible than either
the Court or its critics have realized. Consistent with the above-described
criticisms, Ramirez was wrong to suggest that the text of Section 2 alone
dictates a particular interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause; some
exceptions are just exceptions, not evidence of affirmative endorsement.
Nonetheless, the exception for criminal disenfranchisement does have
affirmative implications. It was understood at the time of its drafting, passage,
and ratification to be consistent with, and even an expression of, constitutional
equality. As shown in Part I, the crime exception is just one instantiation of a
larger political philosophy supportive of criminal disenfranchisement."' By
exemplifying the radicals' widely held view of what equality in the franchise
meant, the crime exception sheds light on the norm of constitutional equality
that animated and shaped the Equal Protection Clause, the rest of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the other Reconstruction Amendments.335 Once
the irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement comes into focus, the proper basis
for Ramirez's "affirmative sanction" holding becomes clear. The "crime"
exception was added because criminal disenfranchisement (at least in some
form) was thought to be an altogether proper regulation of the franchise.
When so reconsidered in light of Reconstruction-era political thought and the
331. See, e.g., HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 126
(1908); JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 14 (1909); Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at 43-44.
332. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55 (majority opinion).
333. Id. at 54.
334. Cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999) (observing that the Eleventh Amendment has
been interpreted "to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ...
which it confirms" (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 778 (1991)
(alteration in Alden))).




irony of egalitarian disenfranchisement, Ramirez rests on a powerful synergy of
constitutional text and history.336
Even when Ramirez is so reconstructed, originalist and other historically
minded interpreters might still criticize the decision's recourse to past
understandings as internally contradictory. The Court assumed, based on prior
case law, that the Equal Protection Clause applies to voting rights. But many of
the Amendment's supporters expressly disavowed that interpretation."' Given
that history, Ramirez's ostensibly originalist analysis might be criticized as
counterfactual. The Court, in effect, asked, "If the Equal Protection Clause had
originally been understood to protect the right to vote, would it also have been
understood to prohibit felon disenfranchisement?" To answer that question,
Ramirez simultaneously construed the Fourteenth Amendment both
historically and ahistorically, such that the meaning of a provision that
originally had nothing to do with voting rights (Section 1) was understood to
have been qualified by a provision that did (Section 2). An originalist might
view that approach as incoherent. It would be better, the originalist might say,
to read Sections i and 2 independently-and best of all to conclude, consistent
with historical understandings, that Section i has no applicability to voting
rights at all. On this view, Ramirez either should have followed originalism to
the utmost and made a radical break with precedent, or should simply have set
history aside.
Yet Ramirez's semi-originalist inquiry could more charitably be
characterized as an attempt to honor the sometimes-competing values of text,
history, and precedent. As the Court itself observed, the question before it -
whether felon disenfranchisement laws infringe the fundamental right to
vote-did not require adoption of Justice Harlan's more stringent originalist
view that the Equal Protection Clause has no applicability to voting rights
336. Ramirez relied on the "crime" exception as evidence of the Constitution's endorsement of
criminal disenfranchisement, but the text and the endorsement are not perfectly congruent.
For example, the apportionment penalty by its terms does not apply either to
disenfranchisement in municipal elections or (because it predates the Seventeenth
Amendment) to elections for the Senate. Yet, the affirmative sanction plainly extends to
those elections: the crime exception and its history illuminate the Equal Protection Clause
and the fundamental right to vote, and those principles apply to all elections.
337. See Pildes, supra note 3, at 45 ("[I]n the domain of democratic governance, the Court has not
confined itself to textual or originalist grounds. Indeed, the Court has acted not in the face
of silence or ambiguity in these sources, but in outright defiance of them. That is the only
fair characterization of the Court's recognition of the right to vote as a fundamental equal
protection right under the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ."); see also supra note 91 (collecting
sources arguing that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was not originally understood
to confer voting rights).
1645
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
whatsoever."' Ramirez instead held only that the Equal Protection Clause in
Section i "could not have been meant" to forbid a practice exempted from the
apportionment penalty in Section 2."' "Perhaps the Equal Protection Clause
originally applied to voting rights, perhaps it did not," the Court could have
said. "In any event, we can be certain of at least one thing-namely, that the
Equal Protection Clause was not originally understood to prohibit felon
disenfranchisement." Ramirez accordingly honored a textually crystallized
historical understanding-that felon disenfranchisement is a legitimate product
of constitutional equality-while simultaneously respecting modern voting-
rights precedents that had expanded the scope of the Equal Protection Clause
beyond its original meaning. Under that approach, not all nineteenth-century
views on the franchise would be "immutably frozen" in the Constitution "like
insects trapped in Devonian amber."34o Only views held by the Reconstruction
Congress and crystallized in constitutional text would be treated as legally
dispositive. Ramirez can thus be viewed as having preserved a role for
constitutional text and original meaning in what would otherwise be an
entirely ahistorical voting rights jurisprudence. Scholars of various stripes have
recognized that similar interpretive flexibility is legitimate or even mandatory
for historically-minded jurists. 4'
Ramirez's critics sometimes suggest that felon disenfranchisement is
entitled to no greater respect than the many nineteenth-century voting
practices that the modern Supreme Court has held to be unconstitutional.342
These critics assume that there is no principled difference between historical
understandings that find textual recognition in the Constitution and those that
do not. But there is a difference. Modern voting rights decisions regularly
conclude that the Framers misunderstood the full implications of the text they
338. Ramirez, 415 U.S. at 54-55.
339. Id. at 55.
340. Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9 th Cir. 1972).
341. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term -Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 81 (2000) (discussing epistemic weight afforded precedent);
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165 (1993) (arguing that a change
in the legal landscape may affect the context and therefore the meaning of other
constitutional provisions).
342. See TRIBE, supra note 328, § 13-16, at 1094 (calling Ramirez "fundamentally misconceived"
because Section 2 "provides no warrant for circumscribing the reach of the equal protection
clause which, as the Court had previously emphasized, is not bound to the political theories
of a particular era"); Ely, supra note 45, at 1195 ("Not everything that was assumed to be
constitutional in 1868 remains immune to the Equal Protection Clause (assuming it ever
was) and Section 2 says nothing stronger on the subject of denying felons the franchise than




had drafted.3 43 Those cases present disputes between modern jurists and the
Constitution's drafters, and so are consistent with the judiciary's responsibility
to construe a written document distinct from the people who created it. It is
quite another thing for a court to conclude that a textual provision resulted
from a mistaken historical understanding and so should not have been written.
A holding to that effect would come uncomfortably close to posing a dispute
between the court and the Constitution itself. Because Reconstruction-era
figures like Senator Sumner, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Susan B. Anthony
appreciated this point, they worked to influence which historical
understandings Section 2 would "crystallize into organic law."'"4
Ramirez's decision to respect a textually crystalized original understanding
might be compared with the similar choice in Gregg v. Georgia.14s Just a few
years after Ramirez, the controlling plurality in Gregg confirmed the
constitutionality of capital punishment based in large part on the text of the
Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the controlling plurality opinion, the Constitution placed express
limits on "capital" crimes and on the deprivation of "life," and so
"contemplated the continued existence of the capital sanction."346 In other
words, a practice recognized in the Constitution could not be per se
unconstitutional. Together, Ramirez and Gregg illustrate text's unique
authority to constrain legal interpretation, even in the most dynamic areas of
constitutional law.347 The importance of textually crystallized understandings
particularly helps explain how Ramirez could have issued in an era when, as
343. Compare, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972), and Harper v. Va. Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (maintaining that "the Equal Protection Clause is not
shackled to the political theory of a particular era"), with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
164-65 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (arguing, based on history, that the Equal
Protection Clause does not confer voting rights), superseded in part by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI, and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (same).
344. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 1224 (Mar. 7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner); see supra text accompanying note 162.
345. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
346. Id. at 177 (plurality opinion).
347. Jed Rubenfeld has argued that that constitutional doctrine generally disregards original
"No-Application Understandings," that is, specific original understandings of what a
constitutional right does not prohibit. See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE
STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (2005). No-application understandings
crystallized in text, however, may constitute an exception to Rubenfeld's rule.
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Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, the Court's voting rights cases
routinely overrode original understandings.
Ramirez's textual foundation also helps explain felon disenfranchisement's
widespread vitality in the United States, as compared with, for example, the
United Kingdom. Professor Whitman has argued that formal equality's
cultural prominence in the United States (partly the result of its origin as an
English colony) helps explain the harshness of American punishments, as
opposed to their French and German counterparts. 34 Without attempting to
answer the many comparative-law questions raised by the world's varied
disenfranchisement laws, it is worth noting that the story of American criminal
disenfranchisement fits Whitman's basic paradigm-with a legalistic twist.
Again, the precise text of Section 2 is what allowed felon disenfranchisement to
survive judicial review in Ramirez, even as the Court struck down many other
longstanding voting practices. By comparison, the United Kingdom embraced
criminal disenfranchisement in the 1870 Forfeiture Act, at roughly the time that
America did."so But because Britain lacked a written constitution, nineteenth-
century notions of formal equality left no foothold for textual or originalist
argumentation. Britain today disenfranchises criminals only when serving
custodial sentences, and the European Court of Human Rights has directed the
UK to enfranchise at least some incarcerated criminals."' If the United
Kingdom's experiences are any guide, American criminal disenfranchisement
may owe its continued legality to the fact that the United States is governed by
an old and venerated written constitution.
B. The Meaning and Scope of "Other Crime"
Ramirez is often criticized for being inconsistent with the original meaning
of Section 2. Based largely on the historical salience of Confederate rebels and
the ejusdem generis canon, many commentators argue that Section 2's phrase
"rebellion, or other crime" was originally understood to mean "rebellion, or
similar crime," such that the phrase would capture only rebellion-related crimes
like treason or espionage."' That conclusion is severely undermined by the
348. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 76-77 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
349. See WHITMAN, supra note 36, at 43, 158-70.
350. Forfeiture Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict. 2, C. 23, § 2 (U.K.).
351. See supra text accompanying note 4.
352. See, e.g., FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 149-50; MANZA & UGGEN,
supra note 44, at 32 ("There is, in short, no clear evidence that the phrase 'or other crime[]'
was intended to have any meaning outside the larger context of punishing the former




history recounted above in Part I, which demonstrates that traditional crimes
were often at the forefront of Congressmen's minds. Of course, "crime" must
resemble (because it includes) "rebellion." But that observation alone supplies
little guidance, since it does not specify just how the terms might relate to one
another.353 History illuminates that relationship. During Reconstruction, there
was considerable doubt as to whether rebellion constituted a crime and was
deserving of disenfranchisement. Radical Republicans wanted to degrade the
rebels, whereas conservatives argued that Confederates were noble combatants
deserving respect. 1 4 Using the phrase "rebellion or other crime" made clear
that the radicals won that debate: Confederate rebels belonged in the same
category as common criminals.ss
Ramirez's critics, moreover, have identified no member of the
Reconstruction Congress who felt that conventional criminal disenfranchisement
would or should trigger Section 2's apportionment penalty. To the contrary,
the historical record-and, indeed, Ramirez itself56 -contains ample evidence
AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL RACISM, AND MODERN CONSEQUENCES
120-21 (2005) (arguing that "'for participation in rebellion or other crime' conceptually
associates the defeated Confederate leadership . . . with other criminals" and that inclusion
of the phrase "or other crime" was inadvertent); Richard W. Bourne, Richardson v.
Ramirez: A Motion To Reconsider, 42 VAL. U. L. REv. 1, 30 (2007) ("[T]he exclusion clause
had nothing to do with felon disfranchisement statutes."); see also John R. Cosgrove, Four
New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Felony Disenfranchisement, 26 T. JEFFERSON L.
REv. 157, 178 n.97 (2004); Jason Morgan-Foster, Transnational Judicial Discourse and Felon
Disenfranchisement: Re-examining Richardson v. Ramirez, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 279,
291 (20o6) ("[T]he 'other crime' at issue in addition to rebellion was treason."); Howard
Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender's Right To Vote: Background and
Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 721, 746 n.158 (1973) ("[Section 2'S] crucial words 'or
other crime[]' are utterly devoid of independent legislative intent, and take on historical
meaning only as part of the phrase 'participation in rebellion, or other crime."'); cf Abigail
M. Hinchcliff, Note, The "Other" Side of Richardson v. Ramirez: A Textual Challenge to Felon
Disenfranchisement, 121 YALE L.J. 194 (2011) (buttressing the ejusdem generis argument with
an intratextual one).
353. See Hinchcliff, supra note 352, at 231-32 (arguing that the ejusdem generis logic is compatible
with "various limiting principles," including serious-crimes-only and felonies-only rules).
354. See supra Subsection I.C.2 and Section I.D.
355. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 130 (Feb. 5, 1869) (statement of Rep. James
Mullins) (urging that Congress should "in our fundamental law brand that rebellion as a
crime" and endorsing a draft containing "a declaration that the nation looks upon the recent
rebellion as a heinous offense").
356. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 45 (1974) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess.
2543 (May lo, 1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham) (noting that Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment would apply if New York disenfranchised blacks "except in cases of
crime")); see also TRIBE, supra note 328, § 13-16, at 1094 (calling Ramirez "fairly persuasive"
on this point).
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that the apportionment penalty did not apply to traditional criminal
disenfranchisement. For example, Senator Grimes proposed to penalize
disenfranchisement "except for crime or disloyalty."5 7 By putting "crime" first,
Grimes conceptually separated it from "disloyalty." The final version of Section
2 deviated from Grimes's proposal only by clarifying that "rebellion" was itself
a species of "other crime."
Congress had good reason not to narrow the range of crimes exempted
from the apportionment penalty in Section 2. A list of all such crimes would
have much been far too long for a Constitution."s And an open-ended
exception for "felonies" or "infamous crimes" would have been ineffectual,
leaving legislatures free to designate which crimes qualify under those
categories - as Reconstruction legislators recognized."' Congress may also
have been attracted to a more administrable bright-line rule applicable to all
state crimes, even before post-ratification experience revealed the full
difficulties of implementing Section 2. 60
Had Congress wanted to narrow Section 2's ambit, it would likely have
added a reference to common law felonies, thereby succinctly defining a closed
set. As we have seen, Republicans in fact adopted that approach in
Reconstruction legislation as well as in proposed drafts of the Fifteenth
Amendment. " But even a common law approach would have had drawbacks.
Many in Congress were wary of imposing permanent and inflexible
constitutional rules on the states.36 2 And excepting only common law felonies
357. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 1320 (Mar. 12, 1866).
35s. See, e.g., id. at 3029 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Reverdy Johnson) ("Murderers,
robbers, houseburners, [and] counterfeiters"); id. at 2535 (May lo, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Ephraim Ecldey) ("pirates, counterfeiters, or other criminals").
359. For example, in discussing the Reconstruction Act, Senator Charles Drake disclosed a
newspaper report noting that in Florida "a negro who commits an assault and battery upon
a white man may be sold into slavery for a period of twenty years." CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess., 2600 (May 27, 1868). Senator Roscoe Conlding interrupted to ask, "Was
that a felony?" Id. Drake responded, "They may declare it to be a felony or they may make
other offenses felonies." Id.
360. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 535-36 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. John
Benjamin) (noting problems of practicability associated with the precursor to Section 2); see
also infra text accompanying notes 410-415.
361. See supra Sections I.D & I.E.
362. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 4 0th Cong., 3d Sess. 899 (Feb. 5, 1869) (statement of Sen. George
Williams) (worrying about imposing "a permanent and inflexible rule of government"); id.
at 861 (Feb. 4, 1869) (statement of Sen. Willard Warner) (discussing the gravity of
"amend[ing] the organic law" by modifying the constitution); id. at 670 (Jan. 28, 1869)




from Section 2's apportionment penalty might have discouraged
disenfranchisement for grave common law misdemeanors like assault,
kidnapping, and forgery, as well as any new offenses not yet defined. 6  The
most foresighted legislators may even have anticipated the need to encourage
(that is, not penalize) what would soon become one of the radicals' major
preoccupations: using federal authority to prosecute Southerners intent on
perpetuating the Confederacy's racist legacy. 6 4
Later, the threat of racially motivated disenfranchisement did cause
Republicans to regret the breadth of Section 2's "other crime" exception, and
Congress implemented that new preference in the Reconstruction Acts. But
Congress did not adopt more limited constitutional language. Congress instead
rejected the radical drafts of the Fifteenth Amendment that would have
constitutionally curbed felon disenfranchisement. These efforts reinforce the
conclusion that Section 2's "other crime" language was understood to be just as
broad as its plain text would suggest. Congress knew how to use limiting
language when it wanted to, and it thrice chose not to do so when drafting the
Reconstruction Amendments. ' Indeed, Congress had inherited a refined
constitutional vocabulary when it came to illegal acts. By the 186os, the
Constitution referred to "infamous crime," "capital" crime, and "high Crimes,"
as well as to "Treason," "Felony," "Felonies committed on the high Seas,"
"Misdemeanors," "Breach of the Peace," "Offences against the Law of
Nations," and "Piracies.", 6 6 Yet Section 2 uses the broad, unadorned term
"other crime."
A better argument for narrowing Ramirez is that the term "crime" was
originally susceptible to two meanings: a broader one including all offenses,
and a narrower one encompassing only serious offenses. 6 Justice O'Connor
outlined that argument in her 2010 decision for the Ninth Circuit in Harvey v.
Constitution an arbitrary and fixed rule that cannot be changed and cannot be reformed
without revolution").
363. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 440 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
the range of serious offenses considered misdemeanors at common law (citing Horace L.
Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 572-73 (1924))).
364. See, e.g., Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870); CONG. GLOBE, 4oth Cong., 3d Sess.
1041 (Feb 9, 1869) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner).
365. Cf Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1o67, 1077 (9 th Cir. 2010) (O'Connor, J.) ("[Wlhen the 39th
Congress meant to specify felonies at common law, it was quite capable of using that
phrase.").
366. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 8; art. II, § 4; amend. V.
367. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1890 (Feb. 27, 1867) (statement of Sen. Charles
Sumner) (rhetorically distinguishing between a "trivial offense" and a "crime").
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Brewer. 6 8 In 1867, Webster's Dictionary offered two definitions of crime. The
first defined "crime" broadly as "[a]ny violation of law, either divine or
human; an omission of a duty which is commanded, or the commission of an
act which is forbidden, by law." , 6  "Crime," then, had a second definition:
"[g]ross offense, or violation of law, in distinction from a misdemeanor or
trespass, or other slight offense. Hence, also, any aggravated offense against
morality or the public welfare; any outrage or great wrong."370 This alternate
meaning echoed Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. Under the
"general definition," Blackstone had said, crime "comprehends both crimes and
misdemeanors.""' Blackstone had then gone on to say that "in common usage
the word, 'crimes,' is made to denote such offenses as are of a deeper and more
atrocious dye; while smaller faults, and omissions of less consequence, are
comprized under the gentler name of 'misdemeanors' only."" This line of
argument finds support in the fact that at least some Reconstruction legislators
had a narrow view of what offenses did or should trigger
disenfranchisement. 7  Even more significant is the Article III Criminal Jury
Clause, which refers not just to "crime," but to "all crimes."" Despite that
textual breadth, the Supreme Court has relied on Blackstone and other
368. See Harvey, 605 F.3 d at 1074 (suggesting the argument summarized in the main text as a
possibility while holding that Section 2's reference to "crime," and therefore its affirmative
sanction, are not limited to felonies at common law).
369. see NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 312-13
(Chauncey Goodrich & Noah Porter eds., 1867).
370. Id. at 313.
371. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *5.
372. Id. In his subsequent discussion, Blackstone himself adopted the common usage, referring
repeatedly to "crimes and misdemeanors." Id. at *5, *7.
373. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 296 and 314; see also CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 2d
Sess. 40 (Dec. lo, 1866) (statement of Sen. Lot M. Morrill) ("treason, felony, or other high
crimes"); CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 792 (Feb. io, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Thomas Williams) (legitimate government "might well disfranchise individuals, such as the
traitors themselves, for an enormous crime," but not "loyal people ... impeached of no
crime"); id. at 431 (Jan. 25, 1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham) ("Well, then, some
gentleman asks, why not go for a constitutional amendment which will declare, once for all,
that no State in this Union shall make any distinction in the right of voting between male
citizens of the United States, resident within its limits and over twenty-one years of age,
save in the case of persons convicted of infamous crimes after due trial? I will answer with
all my heart that I am ready to go for that.").
374. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,




historical sources to construe the Criminal Jury Clause narrowly, so that it
refers only to offenses carrying a sufficiently severe sentence. 17
Justice O'Connor was right that the foregoing history could "support the
proposition that the word 'crime' in Section 2 refers only to serious crimes or
felonies.""' Indeed, a similar argument was raised during Johnson's
impeachment trial.177 But, as the Justice also noted, other authorities support a
broader reading of "crime." Most salient is the Supreme Court's 186o assertion
that "[t]he word 'crime' of itself includes every offence, from the highest to the
lowest in the grade of offences, and includes what are called 'misdemeanors,' as
well as treason and felony.""7 That statement, issued on the eve of the Civil
War, prioritized Blackstone's broader definition of crime, and construed the
Article IV Extradition Clause-the only constitutional provision other than
Section 2 that uses the precise phrase "or other Crime."179 So while there is a
plausible argument that "crime" could have carried the meaning "serious
crime," the issue is a close one. Further, this argument from original
understandings lacks an account of why the Reconstruction Congress would
375. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 16o-61 (1968) ("[I]t is necessary to draw a line
in the spectrum of crime, separating petty from serious infractions."); Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966) (viewing the proceedings as "equivalent to a
procedure to process a petty offense, which . . . does not require a jury trial); Schick v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69-72 (1904) (quoting Blackstone's definition of "crime" and
distinguishing "crimes" from "petty offenses"); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888)
(holding that the Criminal Jury Clause should be informed by the common law offenses to
which a right of jury trial attached).
376. Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F. 3d 1o67, 1074 (9 th Cir. 2010).
377. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. supp. at 293 (Apr. 23, 1868) (statement of Thomas
Nelson, representative for President Johnson) ("When the word 'crimes,' therefore, is used
in the Constitution . . . it is to be understood as embracing felonious offenses, offenses
punishable with death or with imprisonment. . . ."); see also id. supp. at 254 (Apr. 20, 1868)
(statement of Rep. John Logan, impeachment manager) (quoting Blackstone's definition of
"crime").
378. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 99 (1860), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S.
219, 226-29 (1987); cf In re Voorhees, 32 N.J.L. 141, 147 (1867) ("I am not aware that any
jurist, in any age of the common law, has ever doubted as to the meaning of the word
'crime.' It . . . has always been considered as embracing every species of indictable
offence."); id. at 148 (explaining that the term "other crime" in the Extradition Clause
included "minor offences, such as assaults, libels, and the entire train of similar
misdemeanors").
379. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Besides the meaning of "crime," Dennison also relied on the fact
that the Constitutional Convention rejected the phrase "other high Misdemeanor," which
had been used in the Extradition Clause of the Articles of Confederation. See 65 U.S. at
101-02; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 437 (Max Farrand ed.
1911).
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intend a narrower as opposed to a broader meaning, even assuming that both
possibilities were linguistically available.
The strongest argument for cabining Ramirez's affirmative sanction would
focus not just on the original meaning of "crime," but also on the principles
that Section 2 endorsed. Even if Congress used the word "crime" to mean all
offenses, perhaps for reasons of administrability, the term may nonetheless
have evidenced an affirmative sanction that was more limited in scope.38o As
argued above in Part I, Reconstruction Republicans' special solicitude for
criminal disenfranchisement turned on a theory of political morality. Actions
triggered disenfranchisement because they represented deliberate decisions to
defy the legal order. In that key respect, "participation in . .. crime" did indeed
resemble "rebellion." The Framers' coupling of rebellion and crime made sense
during Reconstruction. Indictment and conviction at common law required
intentional conduct, and intent requirements were read into most criminal
statutes."' In the twenty-first century, however, the connection between
political morality and conventional criminality has become more attenuated. 8,
One might doubt, for example, that drug addicts and negligent regulatory
offenders should be put in the same category as the rebels and common-law
felons discussed by Reconstruction legislators.383 Indeed, the pervasiveness of
modern criminalization may itself supply a reason for curbing Ramirez's
affirmative sanction: the fear that widespread criminal disenfranchisement
might undermine republicanism and rule by the consent of the governed
prompted some Republicans to oppose even the disenfranchisement of many
Southerners who had engaged in rebellion.384
380. On the lack of perfect congruence between Section 2 and the crime exception, see supra note
336.
381. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922).
382. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 21, at 1167 ("[M]uch not particularly blameworthy conduct is
classified as a felony.").
383. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
384. See supra text accompanying note 233-234; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1563-64
(Feb. 19, 1867) (statement of Sen. John Sherman) ("If we exclude from voting the rebels of
the South, who compose nearly all the former voting population, what becomes of the
republican doctrine that all governments must be founded on the consent of the
governed?"). But see CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 2535 (May lo, 1866) (statement of
Rep. Ephraim Ecldey) (arguing that rebels have "no right, founded in justice, to participate
in the administration of the Government or exercise political power"). Most Republican
opponents of widespread Confederate disenfranchisement argued from pragmatism and
from the premise that low-level Confederates lacked a meaningful choice but to fight against




Critics of broad disenfranchisement regimes have so far met with no
success in court,"' but they have not yet connected modern changes in the
nature and perception of criminality to the ideology underlying the "other
crime" exception. If Ramirez, "crime," and the affirmative sanction were read
narrowly in light of the Reconstruction era's guiding political philosophy, then
Section 2 might be understood as an endorsement of disenfranchisement only
for crimes of sufficient moral gravity to constitute renunciation of one's
political allegiance to the state. As Justice O'Connor suggested,"' courts might
look to modern legislative judgments for insight into constitutional
seriousness, much as when interpreting the term "crime" in the Article III
Criminal Jury Clause."' If that analysis applied to Section 2, at least
misdemeanors would be unprotected by Ramirez's affirmative sanction. But a
list of qualifying crimes could be more strictly limited. For example, the
affirmative sanction might protect only felonies consistent with the common
law intentionality requirement that was taken for granted in the
Reconstruction Congress." In this way, the intellectual history of Section 2
may cast doubt on the constitutionality of many modern criminal
disenfranchisement laws.
As a matter of precedent, any limits on the scope of Section 2's affirmative
sanction remain unspecified. Ramirez found an affirmative sanction specifically
for the "exclusion of felons" after reviewing a state provision disenfranchising
those convicted of "infamous" crimes.38 9 By contrast, Underwood invalidated an
invidiously motivated disenfranchisement law encompassing many
misdemeanors3 0 -precisely the type of expansive disenfranchisement measure
that Stevens and other Reconstruction radicals had feared.'9 Ramirez and
Hunter leave open the possibility - supported by history - that
disenfranchisement on account of misdemeanors and certain felonies may be
unconstitutional even absent racial animus.
385. See Law ofPrisons, supra note 6, at 1952 ("[C]ourts have refused to scrutinize states' selection
of certain felonies as disqualifying offenses.").
386. Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3 d lo67, 1075 (9 th Cit. 2010).
387. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
388. For a pointed comparison of the common law view of intent with contemporary standards
of mens rea, see WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 260-62
(2011).
389. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
390. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1985) (noting that the plaintiff class
consisted of person disenfranchised for misdemeanors and the law was enjoined as to those
plaintiffs).
391. See supra Section I.C.
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C. The Case for (and Against) Implied Repeal
Judges and scholars have also criticized Ramirez on the ground that the
Fifteenth Amendment impliedly repealed Section 2.39' The argument for
implied repeal offers an interesting case study in the changing terrain of
Reconstruction historiography. In the early and mid-twentieth century, a
number of scholars argued that Section 2 and its apportionment penalty should
be enforced in support of black enfranchisement in the Jim Crow South. 93
Because literacy tests, poll taxes, and other voting rules obviously deprived
adult male citizens of the right to vote, those measures seemed to invite
application of the Section 2 apportionment penalty. Yet those same voting rules
arguably did not restrict the right to vote "on account of race" in violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment. Defenders of Jim Crow accordingly advanced the
case for Section 2's implied repeal in order to defend the racist status quo."'
Times have changed. Today, the apportionment penalty lacks obvious
application, yet Section 2's reference to "crime" continues to legitimize criminal
disenfranchisement. The result is that an argument once associated with
entrenched racism has become popular among legal reformers.
The most comprehensive exposition of the case for implied repeal was
recently set out by Gabriel Chin. 95 Recognizing the "interpretive presumption
against repeals by implication,"", 6 Chin adopted a demanding two-pronged
test. First, the later provision must "clearly [be] meant to occupy the field"
governed by the earlier provision."' Second, the later provision must be in
392. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 351 n.3, 352 n.4 (2d Cit. 2oo6) (en banc) (Parker, J.,
dissenting); FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 149-50.
393. See Eugene Sidney Bayer, The Apportionment Section of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Neglected
Weapon for Defense of the Voting Rights of Southern Negroes, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 965 (1965);
Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Right To Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 112 (1960); Ben Margolis, Judicial Enforcement
of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 23 L. TRANSITION 128, 149 (1963); Zuckerman, supra
note 95, at 125.
394. See Zuckerman, supra note 95, at 125 (discussing early twentieth-century arguments for
implied repeal, which were used to criticize the 1904 Republican Party platform advocating
implementation of Section 2). The basic argument for implied repeal is the same today as a
century ago: The apportionment penalty in Section 2 is said to apply only to racial
disenfranchisement laws later rendered null by the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.
395. Chin, supra note 14.
396. Id. at 276.




"irreconcilable conflict" with its predecessor."" On reflection, however, Chin's
case for implied repeal cannot satisfy either requirement."'
The basic problem with the argument for implied repeal, one noted for
over a century, is that Section 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment are only partially
overlapping in scope.4 oo While the Fifteenth Amendment has a broader ambit
in several respects ,4o it is also narrower in two important ways. First, the
Fifteenth Amendment employs a negative structure, banning
disenfranchisement "on account of race." 4o2 In contrast, Section 2 employs an
affirmative structure and applies to all noncriminal disenfranchisement of adult
male citizens in specified elections. Section 2 thus reaches many facially race-
neutral voting rules, such as literacy tests and poll taxes. Absent invidious
intent, these measures lie beyond the Fifteenth Amendment's ban on racially
discriminatory voting rules.4o3 Second, Section 2 empowers Congress to
implement a unique apportionment penalty. Unless Congress's Fifteenth
Amendment Enforcement Clause authority includes the power to amend the
Article I apportionment scheme ,4o4 no apportionment penalty is available
under the Fifteenth Amendment. Moreover, the apportionment penalty had
distinctive appeal for the Reconstruction Congress because it could be
implemented through legislative action alone. 40 5 Chin is therefore wrong to
398. Id. at 278.
399. For criticism of Chin's precedent-based arguments, see Mark S. Scarberry, Historical
Considerations and Congressional Representation for the District of Columbia: Constitutionality of
the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill in Light of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
History ofthe District, 6o ALA. L. REV. 783, 802 n.59 (2009).
400. See MATHEWS, supra note 331, at 15; Bonfield, supra note 393, at 112 (arguing that Congress
did not have the intention of limiting the imposition of the penalty to cases where the basis
of discrimination is on account of race or color); Zuckerman, supra note 95, at 125
(explicating and rebutting the argument that the Fifteenth Amendment abrogated the
apportionment-penalty provision of the Fourteenth Amendment).
401. Among its advantages, the Fifteenth Amendment empowered Congress to enact remedial
legislation like the VRA and reached more elections. It also had equal effect in the North and
the South, which at the time may have been viewed as its greatest contribution. See
GILLETTE, supra note 88, at 46-48; KEYSSAR, supra note 44, at 75.
402. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
403. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959) (upholding the
constitutionality of literacy tests that are neither designed nor implemented to "perpetuate
that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot").
404. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, 5 2 (providing for congressional apportionment); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, 5 2 (amending apportionment).
405. If any Reconstruction legislators thought that the federal courts would vigorously enforce
the Fifteenth Amendment, they would be badly disappointed. See Richard H. Pildes,
Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONsT. COMMENT. 295, 308 (2ooo)
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assert that "Section 2 is like the Fifteenth Amendment, except that it covers
fewer people" and "offers more limited remedies."406 In truth, Section 2
reaches people and circumstances that the Fifteenth Amendment does not, and
offers an additional remedy.
The Fifteenth Amendment's narrowness-like Section 2's breadth-was
not lost on the Reconstruction Congress.o 7 For example, during late debates
on the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Henderson celebrated the fact that
Section 2's apportionment penalty applied to disenfranchisement for literacy,
(discussing Southern resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court's
acquiescence in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903)); see also Richard H. Pildes, Keeping Legal
History Meaningful, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 645 (2002) (same). For a powerful example of
how congressionally controlled remedies sometimes operated even as the Fifteenth
Amendment remained idle, see Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, supra, at
308, which explains that "[f]rom 1869 to 19oo, the House of Representatives used its
constitutional power under the 'Qualifications Clause' to set aside election results in over 30
cases from Southern states in which the House Elections Committee concluded that black
voters had been excluded due to fraud, violence, or intimidation." Section 2 itself can be
viewed as an effort to normalize Congress's decision in the wake of the Civil War to exclude
Southern delegations based on the Republican Guarantee Clause. See AMAR, supra note 88,
at 368-70 (discussing the legal authority for Congress's refusal to seat Southern delegates).
Notably, both the exclusion of congressional delegates and the Section 2 apportionment
penalty were not viewed as justiciable during Reconstruction.
406. Chin, supra note 14, at 263.
407. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2767 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard) ("No matter what may be the ground of exclusion, whether a want of education, a
want of property, a want of color, or a want of anything else, it is sufficient that the person
is excluded from the category of voters, and the state loses representation in proportion."),
with CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (Dec. 8, 1869) (statement of Rep. Richard
Haldeman) (noting that, under the Fifteenth Amendment, states may "deny the right of
suffrage for idiocy, or poverty, or insanity, or want of property qualification, or want of
education," among other qualifications). Historians have noted the foregoing passages, and
many others. See MATHEWS, supra note 331, at 15; Bonfield, supra note 393, at 112 (citing
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2459, 2510, 2511, 2539-40 (May 8-10, 1866) (statements
of Reps. Thaddeus Stevens, George Miller, Thomas Eliot, and John Farnsworth));
Zuckerman, supra note 95, at 125; see also CONG. GLOBE, 4 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 61o (Jan. 26,
1872) (statement of Rep. Lyman Trumbull); id. at 81 (Dec. 12, 1871) (statement of Rep.
Samuel Shellabarger); id. at 83 (table of states); id. at 64-65 (Dec. 11, 1871) (statement of
Rep. Charles Willard); id. at 35 (Dec. 6, 1871) (statement of Rep. James Garfield); CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3 d Sess. 863 (statement of Sen. Oliver Morton) (Feb. 4, 1869); id. app.
at 97 (statement of Rep. Samuel Shellabarger) (Jan. 29, 1869); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
ist Sess. 3026 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Edgar Cowan); id. at 3031, 3033 (statement
of Sen. John Henderson); id. at 2986, 2991 (June 6, 1866) (chronicling failed efforts to add





thereby providing the South no incentive "to keep the negro uneducated."1408
The Fifteenth Amendment, by contrast, did supply that undesirable incentive,
along with many others. Representative Shellabarger made a similar point
during debates on the Fifteenth Amendment, arguing that it "simply prohibits
the States from . . . disenfranchising for ... race, color, or former condition of
slavery; thus by plain inference authorizing the States to disenfranchise upon
any other grounds than these three."4 o' These and many other statements are
hard to square with Chin's view that courts should read "an implied term into
Section 2 making it applicable only to racial disenfranchisement." 41 o To do so
would be inconsistent not just with the text, but also with expressed legislative
understandings.
Confirming that Congress understood the Fifteenth Amendment not to
repeal Section 2 impliedly, Congress attempted to enforce Section 2 even after
the Fifteenth Amendment's ratification, as Chin himself recounts.4 11 Congress
enacted a statute to implement Section 2 in 1872, after ratification of the
408. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 3033 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. John Henderson)(criticizing the original Committee version of Section 2, which closely resembled the final
version of the Fifteenth Amendment); see also id. at 2767 (recording that after Senator Clark
asked whether Section 2 would penalize a state that "excluded any person, say as
Massachusetts does, for want of intelligence," Senator Howard replied, "Certainly it does,
no matter what may be the occasion of the restriction"). A Virginia legislator testified it was
"obvious" that Southern states would use literacy, property, and other qualifications to
circumvent federal efforts to prevent race-based disenfranchisement. JOINT COMM. ON
RECONSTRUCTION, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, in REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, pt. II, at 35 (1866); FONER, supra note 49, at 252. Before
the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, conservatives proposed a compromise
amendment that would have replaced Section 2's affirmatively structured apportionment
penalty with a more easily circumvented negatively structured penalty limited to racial
disenfranchisement. See Larry G. Kincaid, The Legislative Origins of the Military
Reconstruction Act, 1865-1867, at 169 & n.8 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns
Hopkins Univ.) (on file with authors).
409. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 98 (Jan. 29, 1869) (statement of Rep. Samuel
Shellabarger); see also id. at 899-9oo (Feb. 5, 1869) (statement of Sen. George Williams)
(describing potential for circumvention, including through criminal disenfranchisement);
id. at 862 (Feb. 4, 1869) (statement of Sen. Willard Warner) ("[T]he animus of this
amendment is a desire to protect and enfranchise the colored citizens of the country; yet,
under it and without any violation of its letter or spirit, nine tenths of them might be
prevented from voting and holding office by the requirement on the part of the states or of
the United States of an intelligence or property qualification."); id. at 862-63 (statement of
Sen. Oliver Morton); GILLETTE, supra note 88, at 57-58 (discussing the foregoing quotations
and similar remarks).
410. Chin, supra note 14, at 292.
411. Id. at 301-04. See generally Zuckerman, supra note 95, at 107-18.
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Fifteenth Amendment in 1870.42 Also in 1870, the Census Bureau gathered
evidence in an attempt to implement the Section 2 apportionment penalty, and
Congress debated how apportionment should be affected.413 Congress turned
its attention away from Section 2 only because it seemed that imposing the
penalty would not substantially affect any state's congressional
apportionment.414 Plainly, Congress understood Section 2 to be operative both
at the time of the Fifteenth Amendment's ratification and in the years
thereafter. Chin may be right to conclude that this history "suggests a defect in
Section 2" in the sense that its implementation posed challenges that had been
unappreciated 415 (if not entirely unforeseen 41), but that is a far cry from
showing that the Fifteenth Amendment was understood to have repealed
Section 2. The better inference is that Congress recognized that Section 2 and
the Fifteenth Amendment could operate in tandem. In other words, state
disenfranchisement could result in both a judicial response under Section 1 of
the Fifteenth Amendment and a congressional response under Section 2's
apportionment penalty.417 Congressional enforcement of Section 2 is likewise
compatible with the availability of judicial relief under the Equal Protection
Clause.
There is an even more fundamental defect in the argument for implied
repeal. Chin and others assume that the key question is whether the Fifteenth
Amendment impliedly repealed the whole of Section 2's apportionment
penalty. That approach is insufficiently nuanced. Even if Section 2'S
apportionment penalty were inoperative due to repeal, the "other crime"
exception would still support Ramirez's inference that the Equal Protection
Clause was not originally intended to prohibit criminal disenfranchisement. To
negate that inference, an advocate for implied repeal would have to show not
that the Fifteenth Amendment repealed the apportionment penalty, but rather
412. An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives to Congress Among the Several States
According to the Ninth Census, ch. ii, § 6, 17 Stat. 28, 29 (1872).
413. Chin, supra note 14, at 302-03; Zuckerman, supra note 95, at 11o-11.
414. Chin, supra note 14, at 303 & n.221; Zuckerman, supra note 95, at 112-14.
415. Chin, supra note 14, at 304; see also MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY:
DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH: 1888-1908, at 117-18 (2ool) (describing Republicans'
difficulty imposing the apportionment penalty during the 1890s).
416. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. 3038-39 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard) (discussing the impracticality of identifying both disenfranchised citizens and the
grounds for such disenfranchisement by census).
417. Cf Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at 51-55 (discussing the Framers' view that the availability of
an apportionment penalty would be consistent with viewing racial disenfranchisement as




that it repudiated the "other crime" exception's specific endorsement of
criminal disenfranchisement. What the argument for implied repeal needs, in
other words, is something like the Nineteenth Amendment's specific
repudiation of Section 2's use of the term "male." In a brief attempt to make
that more targeted showing, Chin points out that the Fifteenth Amendment
"gave no special authorization for disenfranchisement even of those who had
committed the most serious crimes.""" But even if silence could count as
repudiation, the Fifteenth Amendment's lack of an express crime exception
simply reflected its narrow negative structure. As discussed in Section I.E, the
Fifteenth Amendment included no crime exception because it did not call
criminal disenfranchisement into question.
If anything, the Fifteenth Amendment's legislative history shows that
Congress remained committed to criminal disenfranchisement. Republicans
deployed formal equality arguments to defend not only the Fifteenth
Amendment's expansion of voting rights but also the legitimacy of criminal
disenfranchisement. The most radical proposals displayed broad affirmative
structures, and they all had express crime exceptions. So if the "other crime"
exception ever shed light on the Equal Protection Clause, it continued to do so
after the Fifteenth Amendment became law. And because the same political
philosophy was at work in both provisions, the interpretive shadow cast by
Section 2 stretches out from the Fourteenth Amendment and over the Fifteenth
Amendment. Ramirez's "affirmative sanction"4 19 holding would therefore stand
even if arguments from implied repeal were correct.
Once the argument for implied appeal is set aside, it is possible to clarify
the relationship between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as
between Ramirez and the Supreme Court's next most prominent felon
disenfranchisement case, Hunter v. Underwood.42 o Ramirez left open whether
the "affirmative sanction" contained in Section 2 would immunize criminal
disenfranchisement laws not just from fundamental right to vote challenges,
but from all challenges under the Equal Protection Clause. Underwood put
those questions to rest: Alabama's disenfranchisement scheme was held to
violate the Equal Protection Clause because it had been expressly adopted and
designed to target black voters. The Court hardly endeavored to reconcile this
new holding with Ramirez, asserting simply that "§ 2 was not designed to
permit the purposeful racial discrimination" evident in the Alabama law.4 "1 But
418. Chin, supra note 14, at 315.
419. Id. at 313 (quoting Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974)).
42o. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
421. Id. at 233.
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how can only some aspects of the Equal Protection Clause apply to criminal
disenfranchisement laws?
The history set out above in Part I points toward a solution. As we have
seen, the Reconstruction Congress supported enfranchisement for virtue and
disenfranchisement for vice. These mutually complementary goals found
expression in two separate provisions, such that Section 2 best exhibited the
Framers' special approval of criminal disenfranchisement and the Fifteenth
Amendment demonstrated their insistence on racial equality in the franchise.
Happily, if somewhat inadvertently, both halves of that original vision have
found recognition in precedent: Ramirez acknowledged the implicit
endorsement of criminal disenfranchisement exhibited in Section 2, and
Underwood honored the Framers' absolute objection to racial voting
qualifications as expressed in the Fifteenth Amendment. So while the Supreme
Court resolved Underwood on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause, that
decision's rule might best be understood as a displaced Fifteenth Amendment
holding.
Indeed, all three Reconstruction Amendments are consonant with Section
2's affirmative sanction for criminal disenfranchisement. Against that view,
George Fletcher has suggested that "the Fifteenth Amendment, on its face,
prohibits depriving felons of their voting rights simply because they were
subject to 'involuntary servitude' as punishment for their crime."422 But while
the Fifteenth Amendment did forbid disenfranchisement "on account of ...
previous condition of servitude,"*4  criminals were not thought to have been
disenfranchised "on account of' their imprisonment. Instead, criminals were
both incarcerated under the Thirteenth Amendment and disenfranchised under
Section 2 for their past actions. Race, slavery, and involuntary servitude, by
contrast, were viewed as "condition[s]" or statuses that the Fifteenth
Amendment rightly banished from voting law. 4 24 Formal equality brings all
three amendments, including the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
"crime" exceptions, into alignment.4'
422. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement, supra note 32, at 1904 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1).
423. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
424. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 4 0th Cong., 3 d Sess. 983 (Feb. 8, 1869) (statement of Sen. Edmund
Ross) ("[T]he late enslavement of the black man gives rise to the prejudice against his
enfranchisement. . . .").
425. Consider also the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which provides that the right to vote in a
federal election "shall not be denied or abridged ... by reason of failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax." The breadth of this provision suggests a provocative question: Could someone
convicted of tax evasion argue that he cannot be disenfranchised for his crime? See Sloan G.




D. Construing the Voting Rights Act
In recent years, the most intensely discussed and litigated issues in the law
of criminal disenfranchisement have concerned the Voting Rights Act (VRA).
Section 2(a) of the VRA prohibits any state "voting qualification" that "results
in" disenfranchisement "on account of race."1426 Section 2(b) provides that
prohibited voting qualifications are to be identified based on a "totality of
circumstances" test relating to a group's "opportunity ... to participate" in the
political process.4 27 While it is unclear just what is required to show an
unlawful denial of the right to vote428 plaintiffs have raised a straightforward
argument that felon disenfranchisement laws fall within the VRA's
prohibition: Those laws appear to impose a "voting qualification," and
criminal disenfranchisement laws have a disparate impact on minority racial
groups. 2 One might think that these points would make out a prima facie
VRA violation and require application of section 2(b)'s totality-of-circumstances
Felon Disenfranchisement, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2007) (pointing out this question
and proposing a solution unrelated to formal equality). The intuitive answer is no. The
Twenty-Fourth Amendment was designed to thwart racist and classist voting restrictions,
not to provide special protection for tax evaders. But can that intuition be squared with the
Amendment's text? Assume for the sake of argument that the purpose of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment was to implement formal equality. Resolving the Reconstruction-era debates
over this precise point, the mid-twentieth century Congress might have concluded that
being poor is more of an involuntary status than an immoral choice. Given that premise,
Congress's principled purpose in creating the Twenty-Fourth Amendment might inform
our understanding of the Amendment's protection for persons disfranchised "by reason of
failure to pay any . .. tax." For example, a sharecropper's "failure to pay" his taxes in the Jim
Crow South would have been viewed as the direct result of his dire economic circumstances
and so would not represent a morally defective decision. The same cannot be said of white-
collar tax defrauders. They are disenfranchised not so much "by reason of' their failure to
pay, but rather "by reason of' their willful choice to defy the law -or so the argument might
go, if adequately supported by historical materials.
426. 42 U.S.C. 5 1973(a) (2006).
427. Id. § 19 73 (b).
428. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 394-96 (1991) (discussing the section 2 "results test"
and related totality-of-the-circumstances test); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43-51
(1986) (discussing standards for VRA section 2 vote dilution claims, as opposed to vote
denial claims); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets
the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REv. 689, 717 (2006) (discussing uncertainty regarding the
appropriate test in VRA vote denial cases and suggesting a modified disparate-impact test
modeled on Title VII jurisprudence).
429. On applying the Voting Rights Act, see Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3 d 305, 368 (2d Cir. 20o6)
(en banc) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), in which then-Judge Sotomayor concluded that
"Section 2 of the [Voting Rights] Act by its unambiguous terms subjects felony
disenfranchisement and all other voting qualifications to its coverage."
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standard. Yet every court of appeals to reach the question has held that state
criminal disenfranchisement laws are immune to challenge under the VRA, at
least absent a finding of intentional discrimination. 43o These courts have all
construed the VRA in light of Ramirez's statement that Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment embodies an "affirmative sanction" for felon
disenfranchisement.4 31 Critics of these decisions often raise arguments already
discussed: that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not endorse
criminal disenfranchisement, that any such endorsement is narrow, and that
the Fifteenth Amendment impliedly repealed Section 2.432 But the VRA
litigation also raises a distinct constitutional issue: whether and to what extent
Congress has authority to regulate state disenfranchisement laws.
Some judges and commentators have suggested that the VRA is
unconstitutional to the extent that it forbids state felon disenfranchisement,"4 3
but courts have so far avoided ruling on the ultimate question of congressional
power. Courts have instead construed the VRA's perceived ambiguity in favor
of Ramirez's affirmative sanction. Despite the VRA's apparent applicability to
any voting qualification, the Second and Ninth Circuits found the VRA's scope
ambiguous primarily based on the statute's legislative history,434 while the
First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits identified a particular textual ambiguity-
namely, that criminal disenfranchisement may not be "on account of race."4 35
While each decision used a somewhat distinctive approach, they can all be
viewed as having adopted a constitutionally inspired canon of statutory
construction against federal preemption of state criminal disenfranchisement
430. The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits held felon disenfranchisement immune to
challenge under the VRA, see Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (ist Cir. 2009); Hayden,
449 F.3d 305; Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F-3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc), while
the en banc Ninth Circuit held "that plaintiffs bringing a section 2 VRA challenge to a felon
disenfranchisement law based on the operation of a state's criminal justice system must at
least show that the criminal justice system is infected by intentional discrimination or that
the felon disenfranchisement law was enacted with such intent." Farrakhan v. Gregoire,
623 F.3d 990, 993 (9 th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
431. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
432. See Hayden, 449 F. 3 d at 349-50 (Parker, J., dissenting).
433. See id. at 330 (Walker, J., concurring); Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1121-25
(9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Richard
L. Hasen, The Uncertain Congressional Power To Ban State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws,
49 How. L.J. 767, 779-83 (2006) (arguing that it is unclear whether Congress may ban state
felon disenfranchisement under the Supreme Court's "New Federalism" jurisprudence).
434. See Gregoire, 623 F. 3d at 993; Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315 (majority opinion).
435. See Simmons, 575 F. 3d at 35; Johnson, 405 F. 3d at 1229 n.30; Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255,




laws."'6 The challenge is to bridge the substantial gap between, on the one
hand, Ramirez's "affirmative sanction" holding regarding the fundamental
right to vote and, on the other hand, the VRA cases' special rule of statutory
construction. Courts have so far crossed that bridge by arguing that the canon
is either a clear-statement rule implementing federalism values or a product of
constitutional avoidance.4 17 Under these approaches, the key question is
whether Congress would strain the Constitution's federal structure by
regulating state disenfranchisement laws." If the answer is yes, then
ambiguity regarding the VRA's scope might be construed in favor of criminal
disenfranchisement, even if similar uncertainty should not be construed in
favor of voting practices that lack affirmative constitutional approval.
Reconstruction history substantially strengthens the argument that
Congress would stretch its lawmaking authority and impinge on federalism
values by preempting state criminal disenfranchisement laws. As discussed in
Part I, criminal disenfranchisement was viewed as a constitutional good
because it realized the formal equality values underlying the Reconstruction
Amendments. Further, there is a Reconstruction-era precedent for
congressional efforts to regulate felon disenfranchisement. As discussed above
in Section I.D, radical leader Thaddeus Stevens learned that Southerners were
applying the criminal law in a racially discriminatory manner to oppress the
former slaves. In the hope of ending that practice, Stevens proposed legislation
eliminating criminal disenfranchisement in the South during the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification. Congressman Bingham and other moderates
resisted. The successful opposition to Stevens's proposal rested on two
interrelated points: that noninvidious criminal disenfranchisement accorded
with constitutional equality and that federal regulation in this area would be a
grave intrusion on state sovereignty. This episode is illuminating. The South
lacked representation in Congress, was subject to military rule, and was
required to hold federally regulated elections. Despite all that, Republicans still
believed that criminal disenfranchisement fulfilled foundational governmental
436. Cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (applying a "plain statement" rule inspired
by federalism values in order to avoid a "constitutional problem"); Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) ("Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally
secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear
in the language of the statute.").
437. See Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F-3 d 24, 42 (ist Cir. 2009) (constitutional avoidance); Hayden,
449 F.3d at 326-28 (clear statement rule); Johnson, 405 F. 3d at 1229 (constitutional
avoidance); cf Gregoire, 623 F.3 d 990 (not clearly identifying either approach).
438. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("The design of the Amendment
and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the states.").
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interests and that Southern states undergoing Reconstruction accordingly
retained a residual sovereign interest in implementing that practice. Congress's
reluctance to eliminate state felon disenfranchisement even in 1867, at state
sovereignty's lowest ebb, raises a serious question whether the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments conferred that authority.
A number of Second Circuit judges tried to deflect questions of
congressional authority and Ramirez's "affirmative sanction" by moving the
debate away from the Fourteenth Amendment and toward the Fifteenth.
Contending that "5 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment .. . in no way diminishes
Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,"4 19 these judges
suggest that Congress should have a free hand when regulating felon
disenfranchisement pursuant to its Fifteenth Amendment, as opposed to its
Fourteenth Amendment, enforcement authority.440 Essential to this facially
persuasive rejoinder is the notion that the Fifteenth Amendment was "not an
extension or continuation of § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment."4 4 ' As argued
above in Section I.E, however, the Fifteenth Amendment was a logical
extension of Section 2's endorsement of felon disenfranchisement." The
framers of both measures believed that morally significant actions like crime,
and not morally insignificant statuses like race, provided a lawful basis for
disenfranchisement. The same political philosophy underlay both the "other
crime" exception in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the ban on
racial voting qualifications enshrined in Section i of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Critics of felon disenfranchisement, therefore, gain nothing by shifting
attention toward the Fifteenth Amendment. Congressional authority over state
criminal disenfranchisement should stand or fall equally with regard to both
amendments.
Some commentators have pointed to the Reconstruction Act as evidence
that Congress possesses ample authority to regulate criminal
disenfranchisement laws."3 Under this view, felon disenfranchisement laws
should be treated no differently from any other type of voting restriction. This
argument has some force. It is true that the first Reconstruction Act restricted
Southern criminal disenfranchisement to the limited set of common-law
439. Hayden, 499 F. 3d at 350 (Parker, J., dissenting).
440. Id.
441. Id. at 352.
442. See supra Section I.E.
443. See Ryan P. Haygood, Disregarding the Results: Examining the Ninth Circuit's Heightened
Section 2 "Intentional Discrimination" Standard in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 111 COLUM. L. REV.





felonies.' What is more, Congress's decision to curtail Southern voting
practices preceded the Fifteenth Amendment's definitive prohibition on
invidious discrimination in the franchise, which affirmatively empowered
Congress to enact prophylactic regulation uprooting invidious state voting
laws. But the Reconstruction Act must be understood in its extraordinary
context. It was a temporary measure enacted when war had diminished the
Southern states' status as sovereigns; it was narrowed based on constitutional
objections; it was followed by a supplemental measure implementing by oath
disenfranchisement for all felonies;*5 and the constitutions of admitted states
generally imposed broad criminal disenfranchisement." 6  Perhaps most
importantly, the Act was passed in the wake of the Black Codes and reports
that Southerners were using criminal disenfranchisement to oppress black
voters. By contrast, the VRA's legislative record contained no showing of
invidious felon disenfranchisement, even though it included ample evidence
that literacy tests and other Jim Crow election rules were used for racist
ends. 4 On balance, Congress's experiences during Reconstruction suggest
that federal regulation of criminal disenfranchisement laws pose unique
constitutional difficulties.
Still, the history recounted in Part I shows that Republicans' support for
felon disenfranchisement was bounded by their conceptually linked
condemnation of racial voting rules. When Bingham opposed Stevens's ban on
felon disenfranchisement, he was concerned that Stevens would have
eliminated in its entirety a practice that was viewed as good in itself."8
Stevens's position could be compared with the argument advanced by the
plaintiffs in Ramirez-namely, that the fundamental right to vote rendered
unconstitutional all criminal disenfranchisement, even though that practice
was expressly contemplated in Section 2. In contrast, the VRA (like the first
Reconstruction Act) did not impose a blanket ban on criminal
disenfranchisement. Instead, judicial inquiry under section 2(b) of the VRA is
open-ended and could be interpreted so as to honor both the "affirmative
sanction" and the Fifteenth Amendment's historically-related authorization to
eliminate invidious disenfranchisement. For example, courts might adopt a
444. See supra Section I.D.
445. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (citing Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, § 1, 15 Stat. 2, 2
(Mar. 23, 1867) (amending the Military Reconstruction Act)).
446. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
447. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132-33 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); Farrakhan v.
Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J, dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
448. See supra Section I.D.
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special presumption, based on states' constitutionally endorsed interest in
denying criminals an "opportunity to participate" in the political process, that
felon disenfranchisement laws do not disenfranchise "on account of race.""' 9
That relatively nuanced approach finds some support. The Sixth Circuit
rebuffed a VRA-based challenge not because the felony disenfranchisement
laws at issue were categorically exempt from the VRA, but rather based on the
section 2(b) "totality of circumstances" analysis. Echoing Sumner, the court
reasoned that felons are not typically disenfranchised "because of an immutable
characteristic, such as race, but rather because of their conscious decision to
commit a criminal act for which they assume the risks of detention and
punishment."4s0 Adopting a similar tack, the United States Solicitor General
has opined that some (though not all) felon disenfranchisement statutes may
be unlawful under the VRA based on a totality-of-the-circumstances test
sensitive to the legal consequences of criminal conviction and incarceration.4 s'
These approaches leave open the possibility that the design or effect of
particular felon disenfranchisement laws could raise reasonable concerns that
the resulting disenfranchisement is really "on account of race," rather than
crime.452 Congressional prophylaxis might then be warranted, even without a
conclusive showing of invidious discrimination.
Like courts in the VRA cases, the Reconstruction Congress confronted a
dilemma of principle. On the one hand, formal equality counseled strongly in
favor of protecting blacks from recognized victimization at the hands of
Southern racists. On the other hand, formal equality aligned with more
conservative federalism principles to counsel respect for state criminal
disenfranchisement practices. The fact that Congress was torn over this
choice - even during military Reconstruction - supplies the strongest argument
for narrowing the scope of the VRA in favor of the Constitution's "affirmative
sanction" of criminal disenfranchisement. But even the "affirmative sanction"
has limits, as Congress's Reconstruction experience shows. Heeding the
lessons of history, courts today can honor the Constitution's special
endorsement of criminal disenfranchisement without categorically immunizing
criminal disenfranchisement from VRA challenge.
449. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
450. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986). Reconstruction legislators, too, would
likely have viewed offenders' morally significant actions as the proximate cause of their
disenfranchisement. See supra note 425.
451. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 11-15, Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F-3d 24(1st Cir. 2010) (No. 08-1569).




CONCLUSION: VOTING, VALOR, AND VICE
Felon disenfranchisement's integral role in one of American history's most
egalitarian chapters comes as a significant surprise. In the judgment of one
eminent scholar, it is "difficult to argue" that those disenfranchised for crime
"enjoy equal protection of the laws.""' While many twenty-first century
commentators would no doubt concur, the framers of the Reconstruction
Amendments-who abolished slavery, championed the Equal Protection
Clause, and extended suffrage without regard to race-would vigorously
dissent. Under the philosophy of formal equality, all these policies, including
felon disenfranchisement, were of a piece. Existing commentary is therefore
quite wrong to suggest that Section 2's reference to criminal
disenfranchisement is a quirky "mystery," a constitutional "afterthought," or
the unprincipled product of "political exigency."45 The intellectual history of
American felon disenfranchisement is not limited to the racist voting practices
prevalent in the Jim Crow South. On the contrary, radical Congressmen
supported the enfranchisement of former slaves for much the same reasons
that they preserved room for states to deny criminals the right to vote. A trace
of the historical relationship between voting and vice remains visible today in
the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 2-which does indeed evidence its
drafters' affirmative approval of criminal disenfranchisement.
The widely recognized historical connection between "ballot and bullets" -
that is, between a group's military service and its subsequent receipt of voting
rights - tells only part of the story. Commentators have rightly observed that
the Fifteenth Amendment was justified in part based on the patriotic heroism
of black veterans."' But the Fifteenth Amendment was not satisfied to
enfranchise black veterans, as Lincoln proposed doing shortly before his
assassination41' Nor was it content to protect the descendants of former slaves,
453. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 151.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 14 and 32-33.
455. See supra notes 42-44, 88, and accompanying text.
456. See Abraham Lincoln's Last Public Address (Apr. 11, 1865), in SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS
OF ABIHAM LINCOLN 219, 223 (Harry W. Hastings & Harold W. Thompson eds., 1921)
(arguing that the right to vote should be "now conferred on the very intelligent, and on
those who serve our cause as soldiers"); see also JAMES, supra note 98, at 5 (discussing
Chase's similar views); PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH:
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EqUALITY IN AMERICA 64-66 (1999) (discussing similar
views held by Grant and Lincoln); McKITRICK, supra note 130, at 338 (discussing similar
proposals by Senator Howard and President Johnson).
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as some in Congress suggested." The Amendment instead aspired to abolish
racial voting qualifications for all Americans. At the same time, the
Amendment was tragically limited in that it forbade only racial discrimination
while permitting indirect means of denying the former slaves political
power.45' The Fifteenth Amendment's limited scope reflected a fragile
consensus in the Republican Party: statuses (such as race and previous
condition of servitude) should not serve as voting qualifications, even if other
voting qualifications that might function as proxies for race (such as
criminality or literacy) were permissible.4 19
While emphasizing the direct relationship between voting and valor,
commentators have lost sight of the inverse relationship between voting and
vice. Yet it was the three-sided interaction of voting, valor, and vice that helped
bring about the liberation and then enfranchisement of black Americans.
457. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. ioo8 (Feb. 8, 1869) (statement of Sen. Jacob
Howard) (proposing amendment protecting "Citizens of the United States of African
descent"). But see id. at loo8 (statement of Sen. William Stewart) (rejecting Howard's
proposal because "it is not based on the theory of the amendment that there is to be no
distinction on account of race and color"); id. at loo9 (statement of Sen. Willard Warner)
("I think to single out one race is unworthy of the country and unworthy of the great
opportunity now presented to us.").
458. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
459. See KEYSSAR, supra note 44, at 81 ("[T]he narrow [and final] version of the Fifteenth
Amendment probably represented the center point of American politics, the consensus view
even within the Republican Party.").
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